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I. INTRODUCTION
The security that national and foreign investors have that their property
will not be arbitrarily expropriated, and that the state will compensate them for
the loss incurred in case it decides to expropriate their property, is a sine qua
non of their decision to invest.' In most developing nations, especially in Latin
America, this sense of security has often been lacking, notwithstanding the
pressing need for extensive private investment to fuel industrialization and
* B.A. (History and Spanish Literature), University of Miami; J.D. candidate, 1992, University
of Miami School of Law. Editor-in-Chief, UNIVERSrrY OF MIAMI YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW.
The author wishes to thank professors Stephen J. Schnably and F.V. Garcfa-Amador of the
University of Miami School of Law for their invaluable advice during the completion of this article.
I "A primary concern of transnational investors is to protect themselves against the risk of
expropriation... [and] although a coherent and predictable legal system is no longer a guarantee
in itself, it remains a sine qua non for foreigners." Amado, Free Industrial Zones: Law and
Industrial Development in the New International Division of Labor, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 140
(Winter 1989). See also Bradley, Managing Against Expropriation, 55 HARV. Bus. REV. 75, 81
(JUL.-AuG. 1977).
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economic development. 2 Even democratic governments have exercised their
sovereign power to expropriate, sometimes arbitrarily, the property of their own
citizens.3
Scholars have dealt extensively with the themes of expropriation and
nationalization of property in the context of the law of state responsibility for the
treatment of aliens.4 It is now a settled principle of international law that a
state incurs international responsibility when it expropriates the property of
aliens in violation of international law.5 However, little has been said about the
international responsibility that a state may incur when it decides to expropriate
the property of its own citizens.
An explanation for this dearth of commentaries can perhaps be found in
the notion that international law governs relations among states. Indeed,
expropriation of foreign nationals' property has long been thought to give rise
to state responsibility only because of the widely embraced Vattelian conception
that "an injury to the alien is an injury to the state, "I for which the state may
seek redress under international law. And the result is paradoxical: Whereas
aliens have long enjoyed protection against arbitrary expropriation under
international law, nationals have been restricted to whatever remedies they may
have available under the domestic laws of their respective states.
This older, more limited conception of state responsibility is obsolete
today. The post-War era has witnessed the rise of a body of international
2For instance, at the turn of the century the most important American investors considered the
Peruvian market a great financial risk. U.S. diplomatic presence was limited to a small legation
whose lack of influence in the high circles of political power was unable to provide the sense of
security that investors needed in order to commit themselves to commercial operations of significant
import. North American investment in Perd did not become significant until'President Augusto B.
Legufa took power on July 4, 1916. Legufa mastered the English language, admired U.S capitalist
expansion, and believed in "manifest destiny." A portrait of President James Monroe decorated his
office in the Presidential Palace. Americans felt that their investments were guaranteed by president
Legufa. And powerful financial institutions, like the National City Bank of New York, soon
became the leading investors and financiers of the Peruvian Government. See J. CAREY, PERO AND
THE UNITED STATES: 1900-1962 67-89 (1964).
3 For example the Mexican government, which in 1982 nationalized the country's banking
industry. See Mitchell, Privatization of Mexican Banks, N.Y.L.J, Sep. 26, 1990, at 3, col. 3.
4 See, e.g., F.V. GARCfA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1974);
I. FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION, A STUDY IN THE PROTECTION OF ALIEN PROPERTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957); S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (1953);
E. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1915); Bindschedler, La Protection
de La Proprigt Privie en Droit International Public, 90 RECUEIL DES COURS (1956).
1 There is a clear and well-established obligation in traditional international law to respect the
vested rights of aliens. See GARCfA-AMADOR, supra note 4, at 268. Recognition of the principle
is reflected in international jurisprudence. See, e.g., Affaire David Goldenberg, (Germany v.
Rumania) (1928), II R. Int'l Arb. Awards, at 909. "Respect for private property and the acquired
rights of aliens undoubtedly forms part of the general principles recognized by the law of nations."
6 "Whoever illtreats a citizen indirectly injures the state, which must protect that citizen." III
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (Translated by Ch. G. Fenwick, 1916).
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human rights law grounded on the premise that "every nation has an
[international] obligation to respect the human rights of its own citizens. 7 Both
the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS)
embraced the concept of human rights shortly after World War II. The UN
Charter expressly committed all member states to "universal respect for, and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms;"8 to "fulfill in good
faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with [the Charter]; '" and
"to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of [universal respect and observance of human rights]. '"
Similarly, the OAS Charter bound its members to "[reaffirm] the fundamental
rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or
sex;"" and "to promote the observance and protection of human rights. 12
Moreover, on December 10, 1948, the UN General assembly signed the
Universal Declaration of Human rights declaring that,
Everyone is entitled to all the rights set forth in this declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as . . . national origin...
[and] no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to
which a person belongs .... 13
On that same year, the Ninth International Conference of American States
adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, declaring
that, "the essential rights of man are not derived from the fact that he is a
national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of his human
personality," therefore deserving international protection.14
7 R.B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
HuMAN RIG-Ts PRACTICE 3 (H. Hannum ed. 1984).
" Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153,
entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. Article 55(c).
9 Id. Article 2(2).
10 Id. Article 56.
" Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S.
No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Dec. 13, 1951; Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, entered into force Feb. 27, 1970.
Article 3(j).
3Id. Article 112.
'3 Universal'Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217 A(III), December 10, 1948, U.N.
Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
11 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. res. XXX, adopted by the
Ninth International Conference of American States, BogotA (1948): Novena Conferencia
Internacional Americana, 6Actasy Documentos297-302 (1953) [hereinafter American Declaration].
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These declarations, though not considered legally binding at the time of
their adoption, expressly provided protection for property rights. The Universal
Declaration provided in Article 17(2) that, "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his property." '15 And the American Declaration declared in Article XXIII
that, "Every person has a right to. own such private property as meets the
essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the
individual and of the home."' 6 Today, both declarations are treated by most
commentators as binding law.17 Subsequent developments in international law
have confirmed this of property rights. Article 21 of the American Convention
on Human Rights provides that, "No one shall be deprived of his property
except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social
interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law."' 8
Similarly, Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides that "No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law." 19 Furthermore, Article 14 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights establishes that the right to property
"may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general
interest of 'the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate
laws." ' Indeed, many countries have enacted domestic legislation for the
15 See Universal Declaration, supra note 13.
16 See American Declaration, supra note 14.
11 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has consistently held that the American
Declaration has binding force. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Res. No.
23/81, Case 2141 (U.S.), of Mar. 6, 1981, IACHR, Annual Report, 1980-1981,
OEA.Ser.L/V/II.54, doe. 9 rev. 1, at 25, paras. 16-17 (1981), reprinted in 2 T. BUERGENTHAL &
R. NoRRis, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, booklet 21, at 6, paras. 16-17 (1983).
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man has arguably been incorporated by
reference into the OAS Charter and therefore binds all OAS members. See Buergenthal, The
Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1985). See
also GARCOA-AMADOR, LA COMPETENCIA DE LA COMISI6N INTERAMERICANA DE DEREcHos
HUMANOS Y LAS OBLIGACIONES DE CUBA EN LA MATERIA 38 (Monograph No. 1984-2, Institute
of Inter-American Studies, GraduateSchool of International Studies, University of Miami)(Countries
which are not parties to the American Convention have an international obligation to respect the
rights set forth in the American Declaration).
1 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at
1, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doe. rev. 2 entered into force July 18, 1978 [hereinafter American
Convention].
19 [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953; as amended by Protocol No. 3,
entered into force Sept. 9, 1970, and Protocol No. 5, entered into force Dec. 21, 1971.
20 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 21, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986. A common element
to these three regional instruments is the requirement of public need or public/social interest. The
eprecise meaning of the terms "public need" and "social interest" may vary slightly according to
how they are developed in different jurisdictions. In Brazil, for example, the term "social interest"
has been defined to involve expropriatory measures destined to "solve ... social problems, that
is, those pertaining directly to the poor, to the workers, and to the populace in general for the
improvement of their living conditions; for a more equitable distribution of wealth, [and] finally,
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implementation of these property-related provisions. 21
The Latin American states, however, have seldom respected the property
rights of their own nationals. Even in countries where the right to property has
been given constitutional ranking, states have trampled over the constitution to
confiscate their own nationals' property. Such was the case of the government
of Perd, which in 1987 attempted to expropriate the country's banking industry
without any justification in the public interest, without prior payment of just
compensation, and without following the procedures set forth in the Peruvian
Constitution. Surprisingly, this arbitrary use of state power was impliedly
condoned at the international level by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. In a patently unreasonable ruling, the Commission failed to protect a
group of Peruvian bank shareholders against the arbitrary expropriation, alleging
it could not assert subject matter jurisdiction over the rights of anyone but
natural persons. The Commission reasoned that, since banks are not natural
persons, and the American Convention protects only the rights of human beings,
the case was not within its jurisdiction. In fact, the Commission's reasoning
dehumanized the shareholders and declared that they did not have any human
rights.
This article analyzes the Commission's failure. It seeks to determine its
main causes and to offer a solution to the problem. In the course of the analysis
it addresses relevant questions of exhaustion of local remedies and examines the
critical role that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights should play in the protection of property
rights. Part II examines the development of the right to property in the Inter-
American system. Part III gives a general background on the Commission's
work and examines the Commission's jurisprudence in property cases. Part IV
sets forth the facts of the Peruvian case and evaluates the implementation of
constitutional protection of property rights in Perd, emphasizing the effectiveness
of amparo' actions in civil law jurisdictions as the last remedy available to the
national prior to the assertion of his claim under international law. Part V
critiques the Commission's ruling on both substantive and procedural grounds.
And finally, Part VI makes a proposal for a new regional mechanism capable
for the attenuation of social inequities." See S. Fagundes, Da Desapropriagdo no Direito
Constitucional Brasileiro, 14 REVISTA DE DiREIro ADMINISTRATIvo 3 (1948).
21 For example, the constitutions of Brazil and Perd, where the right to property is
characterized, respectively, as "garantido" and "inviolable." See CONSTITUCI6N POLTICA DEL
PERt0, Art. 125 (1979); CONSTITUIgO FEDERAL DO BRAsIL, Art. V, § XXII (1988).
1 The arparo action is a constitutional guarantee that protects all individual rights not covered
by the action of habeas corpus stricto sensu. The term habeas corpus comes from a Latin
expression which means, roughly, "bring the body," or "let the body be brought here." Therefore,
it refers exclusively to the physical integrity of the individual and to his right not to be arbitrarily
arrested or detained. The amparo action complements the action of habeas corpus. In our case,
it is the action that protects, inter alia, the right to the enjoyment of property. See E. CHIINos
SoTo, LA NUEVA CONST1TUCIN AL ALCANCE DE ToDOs 351-353 (1980).
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of providing effective protection for property rights in the Inter-American
system.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
In the Inter-American system, every individual - whether a corporate
shareholder, a member of a peasant community, or a simple home or store
owner - has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. This right is
established in Article 21 of the American Convention. The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, however, disagreed with this basic principle in
the case of Banco de Lima. Thus, before we set out to analyze the case in more
detail, it is important that we examine what transpired at the meeting where the
text of Article 21 was studied, debated and perfected, in order to determine
whose rights it was intended to protect.
A. The American Convention
The idea of drafting an Inter-American Convention for the protection of
human rights originated at the Fifth Advisory Meeting of the Organization of
American States, held in Santiago de Chile in 1959 - eleven years after the
signing of the American Declaration of The Rights and Duties of Man. At this
meeting, the delegates approved the Declaration of Santiago, charging the Inter-
American Council of Jurists (IACJ) with drafting an American Convention on
Human Rights. The members of the IACJ set out to work on the project
immediately, producing a Draft Convention in short order.' This draft, dated
September 8, 1959, contained a provision on the right to property that read:
1. Everyone has the right to private property, but the law may
subordinate its use and enjoyment to the public interest.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property, except upon
payment of just compensation, for reasons of the public
interest, and in the cases and according to the forms
established by law.?
Consideration of the Draft Convention was postponed for ten years until
the delegates of the American States met again on November 7, 1969 at the
Inter-American Specialized Conference of San Jos6, Costa Rica. The provision
on the right to property, Article 19 of the Draft Convention, was submitted for
I For a brief history of the OAS meetings leading to the signing of the American Convention
see Manual de Normas Vigentes en Materia de Derechos Humanos, OEA/Ser.LIV/II.23 doc.21
rev.5, 8 de Junio 1977. For a more detailed background to the American Convention see I OAS
GENERAL SECRETARIAT, THE ITrER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES, CONVENTIONS & OTHER
DOCUMENTS 19-51 (F.V. Garcfa-Amador ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM].
4 The Legislative History of the American Convention, in 2 T. BUERGENTHAL & R. NORRIS,
supra note 17, booklet 12, at 108.
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consideration in its original form. Upon the opening of the session, the
delegates of Brazil and Colombia submitted two different proposals to amend the
original text. The Brazilian delegation suggested that the text include a third
clause stating:
In case of expropriation in the public interest of undeveloped lands,
the law may provide for the payment of the compensation by means
of the delivery of official bonds, redeemable by term and
containing a protection clause against devaluation.'5
The Brazilian delegate, Mr. Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, stated that this
addition was offered as a "response to those who criticize the inclusion of the
right to the use and enjoyment of property or of the right to private property, as
representing an obstacle to agrarian reform. 26 The government of Brazil was
of the opinion that,
the text that prevailed in the preparation of the Draft Convention
under study did not take into consideration the recent constitutional
and legal changes that have been approved in most of the American
states for the purpose of making possible agrarian'reform and
other measures.. . indispensable for the attainment of economic
and social development in this hemisphere (emphasis added).27
The measures to which Mr. Dunshee de Abranches alluded were the
expropriation of land holdings for purposes of agrarian reform and the
nationalization of industries involved in the exploitation of key natural resources.
These land holdings and industries are usually owned by foreign and national
corporations. The IACJ text required that payment of just compensation be
made prior to the expropriation, imposing a potentially heavy burden on the
developing American states. The purpose of the amendment proposed by the
2 Id. at 108-109. The proposal submitted by the Colombian delegation did not provide
protection against arbitrary expropriation and, therefore, was rejected by an overwhelming majority
of the delegates. Only the Colombian delegate voted for its passing. The proposal read:
1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right they
freely establish their political organization and likewise provide for their
economic, social and cultural development.
2. For the achievement of their objectives, all peoples may freely dispose of
their natural riches and resources without prejudice to the obligations
derived from international economic cooperation based upon the principle
of reciprocal benefit as well as of international law. In no case shall a
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
Minutes of the Eleventh Session of Committee 1, Nov. 17, 1969, in 2 BUERGENTHAL &
NORRIS, supra note 17, booklet 12, at 108-10 (summary minutes of the Inter-American Specialized
Conference of San Jos6, Costa Rica).
I Observations of the Governments of the Member States Regarding the Draft Inter-American
Convention on Protection of Human Rights, in 2 T. BUERGENTHAL & R. NORRIS, supra note 17,
booklet 13, at 93 (Amendments to the Draft Inter-American Convention proposed by the
Government of Brazil, presented to the Secretariat on November 10, 1969).
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Brazilian delegation was to enable states in financial trouble to compensate the
individual shareholders of the expropriated corporations in government bonds.
These bonds would be guaranteed against currency devaluations, and therefore
would also be negotiable, constituting an effective payment of compensation as
required by the original text.
The delegates of the other nations, however, thought that amending the
draft to provide for payment in bonds was unnecessary. The general sentiment
that prevailed among the delegates at the session was that a set of minimal
guarantees would be preferable to detailed provisions on expropriation, and this
sentiment found final expression in the text approved as Article 21 of the
American Convention.28 As finally adopted, Article 21 was virtually identical
in substance to the IACJ's proposal:
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his
property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment
to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility
or social interest, and in the cases and according to the
forms established by law.29
Like the IACJ's draft, the final text set forth three minimal guarantees
against arbitrary expropriation. First, property can only be taken for reasons of
public utility or social interest. Second, although states have some limited
discretion as to the precise mode of compensation, payment of just compensation
must be made prior to the expropriation. Third, an expropriation can only be
carried out in the cases and according to the forms established by the laws of the
American States.' Furthermore, the rationale of the amendment proposed by
the Brazilian delegation, and the discussion that took place thereafter, clearly
shows that these guarantees were not only intended to protect the rights of home
and store owners, but also those of individual corporate shareholders. Indeed,
Professor Garcfa-Amador, former Legal Counsel to the OAS from 1962 to 1977,
reaffirmed the intent of Article 21 stating that,
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights, and Article 21 of the 1969 American Convention
on Human Rights, recognize that every person, natural or legal,
has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property, without
See Minutes of the Eleventh Session of Committee 1, supra note 26.
9 See Amprican Convention, supra note 18. A third paragraph was added stating that usury
as well as any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.
31 See Minutes of the Eleventh Session of Committee L supra note 26, at 108-9.
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regard to the nationality of such persons (emphasis added)."
Although the American Convention mentions "everyone," and the European
Convention reads "every natural or legal person," Professor Garcfa-Amador
makes no distinction as to whose rights each instrument is intended to protect.
That is only a natural conclusion, for no human being ceases to be human upon
becoming member of a corporation.
B. The American Declaration
The provisions of Article 21 can only be invoked against state parties to
the American Convention. The only Inter-American instrument applicable to
cases involving states that have not ratified the American Convention is the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Unlike the Convention,
however, the American Declaration was not drafted as a treaty, nor did the
conference that adopted it intend it to be a binding legal instrument.
Nevertheless, subsequent developments in the Inter-American system appear to
have given the Declaration binding force for all OAS members by means of its
implied incorporation into the OAS Charter.
In 1967, the OAS General Assembly signed the Protocol of Buenos Aires,
which amended the OAS Charter and enlarged the powers of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. From this revision to the Charter, Professor
Thomas Buergenthal, a former judge of the Inter-American Court, concluded
that the Protocol of Buenos Aires, "changed the legal status of the [American]
Declaration to an instrument that, at the very least, constitutes an authoritative
interpretation and definition of the human rights obligations binding on all OAS
member states under the Charter of the Organization. 1
32
31 F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DEL DESARROLLO 137, n.6 (1987).
The original Spanish text reads:
El articulo I del Protocolo [nam. 1 de 1952] a la Convenci6n [europeal sobre la
Protecci6n de los Derechos Humanos y las Libertades Fundamentales (1950) y el
articulo 21 de la Convenci6n Americana de Derechos Humanos de 1969, reconocen
a toda persona, natural o juridica, el derecho al uso y el disfrute de sus bienes,
cualquiera que sea la nacionalidad de dichas personas.
32 Buergenthal, supra note 17, at 3. In fact, Article 1 of the Statute of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights - adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 pursuant to the amended
OAS Charter - declares that the Commission is an "organ" of the OAS and further provides that,
For the purposes of the present Statute, human rights are understood to be:
a. The rights set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights, in
relation to the States parties thereto;
b. The rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man, in relation to the other member states.
For the text of the Coomission Statute see HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIoHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.60, Doe. 28, rev. 1, at 107
(1983), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), I THE INTER-AMERICAN SYsTEM, supra note 23, pt. 2,
at 98. See also BASIC DOcuMENTs PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, OEA/Ser. LIV/II.71, Doe. 6, rev. 1, at 65 (1988).
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is in complete
agreement with Professor Buergenthal's position. The Commission has
consistently held that the American Declaration has binding force on all OAS
members as a result of the Protocol of Buenos Aires, and that all OAS members
have an international obligation to abide by its provisions. For instance, in case
2141 the Commission held that,
The international obligation of the United States of America [not
a state party to the American Convention], as a member of the
Organization of American States (OAS), under the jurisdiction of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is
governed by the Charter of [the] OAS (Bogotd, 1948) as amended
by the Protocol of Buenos Aires on February 27, 1967, ratified by
[the] United States on April 23, 1968 .. . .As a consequence of
articles 3j, 16, 51 e, 112 and 150 of this Treaty, the provisions of
other instruments and resolutions of the OAS on human rights
acquired bindingforce. Those instruments and resolutions approved
with the vote of [the] U.S. Government, are the following: [the]
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Bogotd,
1948); [the] Statute and Regulations of the IACHR 1960, as
amended by resolution XXII of the Second Special Inter-American
Conference (Rio de Janeiro, 1965) [and the] Statute and
Regulations of [the] IACHR of 1979-1980 (emphasis added).33
Aside from its status as a part of, or interpretation of, the OAS Charter,
the American Declaration likely represents customary law in the Americas. Dr.
Carlos Garcfa Bauer, a former member of the Inter-American Commission who
headed the Guatemalan delegation to the Conference that prepared the draft of
the Protocol of Buenos Aires, has stated that, "considering the evolution that
human rights have undergone since the adoption of the American and Universal
Declarations, it is my opinion that they have acquired the status of international
obligations."I4 Furthermore, even for a country like Cuba, which, in addition
to not having ratified the American Convention, has persistently denied the
competence of the Inter-American Commission to receive complaints against the
state, "'human rights' are understood to be those 'consecrated in the American
Declaration' of 1948 ... [and] the obligation to respect the rights of the human
person, established since the original [OAS] Charter of 1948, retains full validity
for all [OAS] members."35
Having recognized the normative status of the American Declaration, the
I See Case 2141, supra note 17.
34 See C. GARciA BAUER, infra note 61, at 109.
35 See F.V. GARciA-AMADOR, supra note 17. The original Spanish text reads: "[Lia obligaci6n
de respetar los derechos de la persona humana, consignada desde la carta original de 1948, conserva
su plena validez para todos los Estados miembros, sean o no Partes en Ia carta reformada."
1991]
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critical question for our purposes becomes whether its provisions can effectively
protect an individual against arbitrary takings of his property. The American
Declaration protects all fundamental rights provided in the constitutions of the
American States, and among these rights is the right to property. Most Latin
American constitutions are very explicit and precise in protecting property as a
fundamental right. For example, Article 5, Clauses XXIV and XXV of the
Brazilian constitution provide, respectively, that,
The law shall establish the procedure for expropriation on the
grounds of public necessity or utility, or in the interest of society,
against fair indemnification made in advance and in cash . ... In
the event of imminent public danger, the appropriate authority may
use private property and the owner is assured of subsequent
indemnification if damage occurs.36
Article 19, Clause 24 of the Chilean constitution provides even more specific
protection, establishing that,
In no case may anyone be deprived of his property... except by
virtue of a general or a special law which authorizes expropriation
for the public benefit or the national interest, duly qualified by the
[legislature]. The expropriated party may protest the legality of the
expropriation action before the ordinary courts of justice and will,
at all times, have the right to indemnization for patrimonial harm
actually caused, to be fixed by mutual agreement or by a sentence
pronounced by said tribunals in accordance with the law . . .. In
the absence of an agreement, the indemnization shall be paid in
cash. Material possession of the expropriated property will take
place following total payment of the indemnization . ...
Provisions like these - which are even more strict than those contained in
Article 21 of the American Convention - are at the heart of most Latin American
constitutions. Nationals of states not parties to the American Convention can
therefore claim international protection of their constitutional right to property
by denouncing the violation of Article XVIII of the American Declaration before
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Article XVIII provides that,
Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his
legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple,
brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of
6 CONSTITUI(;AO DA REPUBLICA FEDERATIVA Do BRASIL, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. 1990) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONS], Vol. III, at 2.
37 CONsTITUCI6N POLiTICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE, in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36,
Vol. Il, at 13.
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authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental
constitutional rights (emphasis added).38
If the constitution of an American state protects property as a fundamental
right, the state is bound to protect the individual against arbitrary takings of his
property. Any member state of the OAS engaging in arbitrary expropriations
in violation of its own constitutional provisions, would make itself liable under
international law for violating Article XVIII of the American Declaration.39
C. The Right to the enjoyment of Property in Customary International Law
Before it was established in numerous multilateral treaties and
declarations, the right to property evolved throughout the centuries into a
recognized principle in the practice of states. This evolution had its early
beginnings in the law of ancient Romans, who developed a rudimentary system
for the protection of property rights.' The Romans exercised their right of
eminent domain mainly to demolish old private dwellings and erect new public
buildings.4 In all cases of expropriation, they compensated the affected
owners. Later in the twelfth century, the English Magna Charta established a
principle of procedure for the protection of patrimonial rights proclaiming in
Article 39 that no man could be deprived of his property "without a prior
judgment by his peers and according to the law of the land. "42 This procedural
safeguard was the precursor of modem judicial protection against arbitrary
exercises of the state's right of eminent domain.
Centuries after, when the ideas of the enlightenment were sweeping
throughout Europe, the Baron de Montesquieu advanced the principle of just
s See American Declaration, supra note 14.
31 The International Court of Justice has recognized the principles expressed in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as having the force of an international obligation, even in the absence
of supplementary conventional instruments. See M. Schreiber, La Pratique Ricente des Nations
Unies dans le Domaine de la Protection des Droits de l'Homme, 145 RECUEIL DES COURs 322
(1976); E. Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and The Human Rights Clauses of the
Charter, 66 Am. J. INT'L L. 348 (1972). Article 17(2) of the Universal Declaration provides
specific protection against arbitrary expropriation establishing that, "No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property." see Universal Declaration, supra note 13.
1 See Scalvanti, La Espropriazione per Pubblica Utilita, in IV PRIMO TRATrATO COMPLETO
DI DirTo AmmsTRATIVO 3 (1904). Although not a system in the true sense of the word, the
Roman concept contemplated a forced "sale" of the property in question. Thus, the owner was
compensated, either in valuables, fungible goods, or privileges. See 0. MEDAUAR, DESTINAQAO
Dos BENs EXPROPIADOs 33 (1986).
11 See Giaquinto, Espropriazione per Pubblica UtiMitl, in V Nuovo DIGESTO ITALIANO 650
(1938).
4 M. DUVERGER, CONSTITUTIONS ET DOCUMENTS POLITIQUES 442 (1974).
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compensation.43 Familiar with Roman laws and customs, the great French
thinker wrote in his influential book, The Spirit of the Laws, that "When the
public needs the property of a private individual . . . to erect a new public
building, [or] to construct a new public road, it must indemnify [the owner]." 4
He denied the State had any superior right over private property beyond the bare
essentials of eminent domain. Having forced the individual to "sell his
inheritance," the state could do no less than compensate him for the taking.45
The ideas of Montesquieu and other great French thinkers of his time
found their highest expression in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen, promulgated by the French National Assembly in August 26, 1789.
Article 17 of the Declaration provided that, "property, being a sacred and
inviolable right, cannot be taken away, unless evidently required by public
necessity, legally verified, and after payment of just compensation. "46 This
provision established three rigorous requirements, strikingly similar to those set
forth in the American Convention: Before the state could legally expropriate the
property of an individual, (1) it had to prove the existence of a public necessity,
(2) such necessity had to be legally verified (implying judicial determination),
(3) and payment of just compensation had to be made prior to the
expropriation.47
On September 3, 1791, the principles contained in this Declaration were
embraced by the framers of the French Constitution who, mindful of the
importance of protecting the right to property, sternly declared: "The
Constitution guarantees the inviolability of the right to property, or that prior
payment of just compensation be made in cases where a public necessity, legally
verified, demands that [the right to property] be sacrificed. "'4 That same year,
the Bill of Rights was adopted as part of the American Constitution. The Fifth
Amendment provided that "No person shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty or
I The concept of compensation was known to the Glossators of the first university in Bologna,
Italy. Statutes of the time contain certain provisions for the payment of compensation. However,
the idea of providing "just" compensation was developed later in the Modem Age by jurists and
theologians who associated it with concepts of natural law. See U. Nicolini, Fspropriazione per
Pubblica Utilit, in XV ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DiRITro 804-5 (1966).
4 MONTESQUIEU, XXVI DE L'EsPRIT DES Lois ch. XV (1748).
1 "It is enough that [the state] can force the individual to sell his inheritance and that he be
deprived of such great principle of the civil law that he cannot be forced to alienate his property."
Id.
IM. DUvERER, supra note 42, at 10. The original French text reads: "La propri&6 tant un
droit inviolable et sace, nul ne peut en etre priv6, si ce nest lorsque la ndeessit6 publique,
16galement constatde, l'exige 6videmment, et sous la condition d'unejuste et prralable indemnit."
47 See 0. MEDAUAR, supra, note 40.
1 M. DUVERGER, supra note 42, at 11. The original French text reads: "La Constitution
garantit l'inviolabilit6 des propridt&s, ou la juste et prdalable indemnit6 de celles dont la necessit6
publique, 1dgalement constat~e, exigerait le sacrifice."
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property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation. "49
Both the American and French constitutions had great influence in the
development of the law and of the legal institutions of many nations in the
Western world. Indeed, the right to property has become a universal right,
thoroughly protected by almost all the constitutions of the world, including those
of diverse countries such as Germany"°, Italy, 5' Argentina, 2 Japan, 3
Portugal,' Switzerland, 5  Spain, 6 Chile 7 and Brazil. s  Moreover, the
practice of protecting the individual against arbitrary takings of his property has
been plainly consistent with prevailing international law. An essential purpose
of the law of international claims has been to provide for such protection. And
the State's obligation to compensate aliens for the taking of their property has
long been recognized as a basic principle of customary international law.5 9
Indeed, protecting the right to property has been the concordant practice of
states for such a considerable period of time that, the old age of the principle,
coupled with its widespread practice and international recognition, fulfills all the
requirements set by the law of nations for the establishment of a rule of
customary international law.60
49 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
o See THE BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1949) Art. 14-15, in
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, vol. VI.
51 See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY (1947) Art. 42, in CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 36, vol. VII.
52 See CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA ARGENTINA (1853) Art. 17, in CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 36, vol. I.
'3 See THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN (1947) Art. 29, in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, vol.
VII.
54 See CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC (1982) Art. 62, in CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 36, vol. XV.
55 See THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION (1982) Art. 22, in
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, vol. XVII.
56 See CONSTrrUCi6N DE ESPANA (1979) Art. 33, in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, vol. XVI.
S See supra note 37.
58 Id.
11 See supra note 4.
60 The UN International Law Commission has set the following elements as necessary for the
establishment of a norm of customary law:
a) A concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type of
situation falling within the domain of international relations;
b) A continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time;
c) A conception that the practice is required by or consistent with prevailing
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III. THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION AND THE PROTECTION
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Brief Background on the Inter-American Commission6 '
One of the most important conferences in the history of human rights in
the Inter-American System took place at the Fifth Advisory Meeting of the
Organization of American States, held in Santiago de Chile in August, 1959.
At that meeting, the delegates of the American States decided to create an Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, charged with "promoting" human
rights within the Inter-American system. Six years later, in November, 1965,
the Second Extraordinary Inter-American Conference of Rfo de Janeiro adopted
Resolution XXII, broadening the powers originally granted to the Inter-American
Commission at the Fifth Advisory Meeting. The resolution empowered the
Commission, inter alia,
a. To give particular attention to observance of the human
rights referred to in Articles I, II, III, IV, XVIII, XXV, and
XXVI of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man;
b. To examine communications submitted to it and any other
available information; to address to the government of any
American State a request for information deemed pertinent
by the Commission; and to make recommendations, when it
deems appropriate, with the objective of bringing about more
effective observance of fundamental human rights.62
Only two years later, in 1967, the Protocol of Buenos Aires amended the
OAS Charter, changing the status of the Commission from that of an
autonomous entity to that of an "organ" of the organization by which the OAS
was to accomplish the protection of human rights in the Inter-American system.
This salutary change from a role of promotor to that of protector of human
rights was only the first step toward the significant enlargement of the
international law;
d) General acquiescence in the practice of other states.
II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26 (1950). Needless to say, all these requirements are met by
the right to the enjoyment of property.
6 The purpose of this section is to provide a brief general background to the functions and
procedures of the Inter-American Commission. Thus, it is by no means exhaustive. For more
comprehensive accounts see, e.g., R. Norris, The Individual Petition Procedure of the Inter-
American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in H. HANNUM ED., supra note 7; C. GARCfA
BAUER, Los DERECHOS HUMANOS EN AMERICA (1987); NEWMAN & WESBRODT, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS (1990); and F.V. GARCfA-AMADOR, supra note 17.
1 The Commission itself incorporated the provisions of Resolution XXII into its Statute under
the heading of Article 9(bis). See C. Medina Quiroga, The Battle of Human Rights: Gross,
Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System, in NEWMAN & WEISBRODT, supra note 61.
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Commission's powers that took place after the entry into force of the American
Convention.
The Convention allows any person, or group of persons, or any
nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the
OAS, to file individual petitions with the Commission alleging violations of the
Convention by a state party. If a petition is admitted, the Commission may
request that the respondent state provide any information related to the petition
as quickly as possible, within 90 days after the date on which the request is sent.
Even at this stage of the proceedings, the Commission may request that the
respondent state take provisional measures to avoid irreparable damage in cases
where the denounced facts are true. If the government does not respond to any
one of the allegations set forth in the complaint, or fails to challenge the facts,
its silence may provide the basis for a presumption of the truth of the
allegations. The Commission's regulations further state that a request for
precautionary measures, and their adoption by the respondent state, does not
prejudice the final decision made by the Commission.
Once this first procedural stage is completed, the Commission examines
the petition to determine whether the grounds for it still exist. If they do, the
Commission proceeds to examine the merits. At this point, the Commission
may opt for a friendly settlement between the parties. If such settlement is not
reached, and the respondent state is not party to the American Convention, the
Commission issues a final decision in a confidential report which is transmitted
to the parties. If the government fails to implement any of the Commission's
recommendations set forth in the confidential report, the Commission may then
publish it as part of its Annual Report to the OAS General Assembly.
In cases involving states parties to the American Convention, however,
the procedure does not end at the reporting stage. Within three months from the
issuance of the confidential report, either the Commission, or the respondent
state, can submit the case to the Inter-American Court. The decisions of the
Court are binding on all states under its jurisdiction. However, since the
Commission is not required to submit a case to the Court, a problem crucial to
our analysis arises in this context. The Commission has wide discretion to
restrict the Court's jurisdiction, and to deny the affected individual access to
enforceable judicial remedies. This is the case even where the respondent state
has accepted the Court's jurisdiction. This situation can only be considered as
highly unfortunate, for, as we will see in the section discussing the case of
Banco de Lima, the Inter-American Court is, in many instances, better qualified
than the Commission to engage in sophisticated interpretation of the American
Convention.
B. Commission's Rulings on Property
An examination of the Commission's jurisprudence reveals at least six
cases dealing with the protection of property rights. Of these six cases, only
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two merit consideration for the purposes of this paper.' The first case
involved the nationalization of all Peruvian private newspapers decreed by the
military Government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado on July 23, 1974.' 4
According to the text of the Commission's Resolution, the expropriating decree
affected also the rights of shareholders in the enterprises which distributed the
newspapers, the stock they issued, and the movable and immovable property of
third persons in possession of these enterprises.
The Commission took up the case and placed itself at the disposal of the
parties. The text of the resolution shows that the Commission was concerned
with protecting the right to freedom of expression, rather than the property
rights of the newspapers' shareholders. However, the only way that freedom
of expression could have been preserved was by protecting the newspapers
against the arbitrary expropriation. Now, did the newspapers have human
rights? By taking up the case, the Commission recognized that, even if
newspapers are not human beings, their arbitrary expropriation was affecting the
rights of journalists and owners. The real issue was not whether the newspapers
were human beings. Clearly, they were not. The issue was whether the
Peruvian government, by expropriating the newspapers, was violating the human
rights of those human beings who stood behind the corporate name of each
newspaper. Again, the Commission was concerned with preserving freedom of
expression. Thus, it was concerned with the rights of those who wrote the ideas
expressed in the newspapers, that is, the journalists, and with the rights of those
who made possible the expression of the journalists' ideas, that is, the publishers
and owners of each of the newspapers.
In 1979, the Commission had the opportunity to decide an even more
interesting case involving the arbitrary expropriation of corporate shares in a
I In two of the other four cases, the Commission admitted petitions filed by "juridical beings."
See Case 9642 (PARAGUAY) INTER-AM C.H.R. 111, Resolution No. 14/87, March 28, 1987
(Resolving that the government of Paraguay should equitably indemnify the company, "Radio
Nandutf," and its employees, for losses incurred as a result of a government-ordered shutdown and
subsequent bankruptcy. Although no direct expropriation was carried out, the resolution was based,
inter alia, on the property clause of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man);
Case 9250 (PARAGUAY) INTER-AM C.H.R. 70, Resolution No. 6/84, May 17, 1984 (Admitting
a petition filed by "Diario ABC Color," a Paraguayan newspaper, and declaring that the government
had violated Articles IV (freedom of expression) and XXVI (due process) of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The Commission resolved to recommend that the
government of Paraguay should allow the printing and free circulation of "Diario ABC Color," a
Paraguayan corporation, and leave without effect the resolution of the Paraguayan Ministry of
Interior which suspended its publication). See also Case 3519 (HAITI) Resolution No. 46/82
OEAISer.L/V/II.55, doe. 70, 9 March 1982; and Case 3405 (HAITI) Resolution No. 41/83
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.63, doe. 10, 24 September 1984. In Resolution 15/83 (Haiti) Inter-Am C.H.R.
(1983), the Commission resolved to recommend that the government of Haiti should return the
company, "Imprimiere Serge Bissainthe," a printing business, to its legitimate owners).
' For the full text of the Commission's ruling see Case 1866 (PERU), INTER-AM. C.H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49, doe. 21, 11 April 1980. The facts are taken from this document.
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Nicaraguan corporation.' On June 20, 1979, the government of Nicaragua
decreed the nationalization of several national industries. Among these
industries was Empresa Cereales de Centroam~rica S.A. (CERSA). The
government confiscated the shares of this corporation without payment of just
compensation. One of CERSA's shareholders, Mr. Carlos Martfnez Rigueiro,
filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission alleging that the
government had violated his right to private property as set forth in Article 21
of the American Convention. The Commission agreed, and on April 18, 1986,
resolved,
1. To declare that the government of Nicaragua has violated the
right to private property set forth in Article 21 of the
American Convention on Human Rights by confiscating the
dividends earned on shares owned by Mr. Carlos Martinez
Rigueiro in the Empresa Cereales de Centroamdrica S.A.
(CERSA).
2. To recommend to the Government of Nicaragua that it take
steps to reimburse, in accordance with the law, Mr. Carlos
Martfinez Rigueiro for the amounts owed to him as unpaid
dividends .... (emphasis added)
The Government of Nicaragua submitted several observations on the case. But
the Commission again rejected the government's arguments. Mr. Martfnez
Rigueiro, in his answer to the government's observations, asked the Commission
to amend its prior resolution because, although it had mentioned the confiscated
dividends, it had not rendered a decision on the shares themselves. Again, the
Commission agreed, and on March 27, 1987, issued Resolution No. 2/87,
resolving,
1. To declare that the Goveinment of Nicaragua has violated
the right to private property set forth in Article 21 of the
American Convention on Human Rights by not giving Mr.
Carlos Martinez Rigueiro adequate compensation for shares
he owned in the Empresa Cereales de Centroamdrica S.A.
(CERSA) and dividends earned on those shares.
2. To recommend to the Government of Nicaragua that it
proceed to reimburse Mr. Carlos Martfnez Rigueiro for the
amounts owed to himfor his shares in the Empresa Cereales
de Centroamdrica S.A. (CERSA) and dividends thereon..
.(emphasis added)
For the full text of the Commission's ruling and resolutions, including the observations made
by the parties, see Case 7788 (NICARAGUA) OEA/Ser.L/II.71, Doe. 9, rev. 1, 22 Sept. 1987.
The facts are taken from these documents.
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In the view of the Commission, Mr. Martfnez Rigueiro had not lost his
humanity upon purchasing his shares in Cereales de Centroam6rica. By taking
up the case and protecting the rights of Mr. Martfnez Rigueiro, the Commission
recognized that Article 21 was fully applicable to corporate shareholders.
IV. THE PERUVIAN CASE: Banco de Lima Shareholders v. Peril
For the nations that have ratified the American Convention, Article 21
constitutes a binding international obligation to respect the property of every
individual within their territories, including that of their own nationals. Such
is the case of Pern. Nevertheless, domestic law is relevant to the inquiry here
in two respects. First, as is true with any other international agreement, the
American Convention can become a source of domestic legal rights for nationals
of a state party only through its incorporation in some manner into that nation's
own internal law. Second, individuals affected by an arbitrary expropriation can
avail themselves of their international standing before the Inter-American
Commission, only when all local remedies have been exhausted or when a denial
of justice has been shown. It is therefore fitting that, before we set out to
analyze the interlining of the Peruvian case, we examine how the Peruvian legal
order has attempted to give constitutional force to the human right to the
enjoyment of property.
A. Peri: The Constitution and Human Rights
The Peruvian Constitution of 1979 is perhaps the most prominent example
of the importance that human rights acquired in the Latin American legal order
during the post-War era.' In their zeal for giving maximum legal force to
human rights treaties, the members of the constitutional assembly went beyond
signing and ratifying the American Convention. They incorporated the
Convention norms and proceedings into the very text of the constitution. Article
105 and the Sixteenth General Disposition of the Constitution provide,
respectively:
105: The provisions in a treaty relative to human rights have
constitutional ranking. They cannot be modified except by
the procedure which applies for the reform of the
Constitution.
Here we must distinguish the theoretical legal order from the practical application of the
norms contained in it:
lit is one thing to have an in force-Constitution, solemnly promulgated; it is
another thing to have an effective Constitution, one that can be applied, that can be
invoked as having the force of an obligation; and finally, it is another thing to have
an applied Constitution, one that is effectively enforced in our political,
administrative, economic and social life. Y.J. DE MmANDA GUIMARAES,
COMENTARIOS A CONsTITUICAO: D MTOS E GARANTIAs INDIVIDUAIS E COLETIVAS
107 (1989).
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16: The American Convention on Human Rights of San Josd,
Costa Rica is . . . ratified, including articles 45 and 62
relative to the competence of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court
on Human Rights.
Article 105 represents a revolutionary step in Peruvian constitutional
history. It gives nationals the right to invoke in local courts the provisions of
the American Convention through habeas corpus or amparo actions.67 This
right of treaty self-execution has no parallel in any other Latin American
jurisdiction. As a constitutional provision, it prevails over any other legal norm,
including laws enacted by the Congress of the Republic and acts of the executive
and judicial branches.' It follows that a Peruvian national can invoke Article
21 of the American Convention in domestic courts, with full constitutional
authority, whenever the government violates, or attempts to violate, his human
right to the enjoyment of property.
The -Sixteenth General Disposition ratified the American Convention and
recognized the competence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
to hear complaints against the state and to act upon them. Furthermore, it also
recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, committing the state to abide by the principles set forth in the American
Convention and to obey the Court's rulings in any case duly submitted to the
Court. No fuller protection could have been given to human rights by an
American state within the framework of the Inter-American System.
B. Per: The Constitution and Property Rights
In matters of property, the framers decided to go beyond ratifying the
American Convention. They enshrined the right to property as a fundamental
right of the individual, specifying the cases in which property can be
expropriated and going further than Article 21 of the American Convention in
establishing the mode of compensition. The framers wrote:
67 See E. Chirinos Soto, supra note 22, at 116. Commenting the article, Dr. Chirinos Soto
wrote,
Perfecto. Inobjetable. En el capftulo de derechos humanos, la Constituci6n de
1979 tiene la maxima amplitud posible. Puede invocarse la violaci6n, en el Peri,
de la Declaracidn Universal de Derechos Humanos o del Pacto de San Jos6 de
Costa Rica, para ejercitar, ante nuestros tribunales, acci6n de habeas corpus o de
amparo.
6 Article 87 provides that "The Constitution prevails over any other legal norm." See
CONSTrrUCI6N POLfTICA DEL PERC (1979).
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Property is inviolable. The state guarantees it. No one may be
deprived of his property except for reason of public utility or social
interest, declared in accordance with law, and after payment in
cash of just compensation (emphasis added).69
Like the Brazilian delegate to the American Convention, the framers of
the Peruvian Constitution felt that requiring that payment of just compensation
be made only in cash in every instance exacted a potentially heavy obligation
from the state. Mindful that this requirement could prevent expropriations
designed to counter a national emergency or to effect social reforms, the framers
decided to lessen the burden on the state by providing that payment could be
made in bonds or installments. This provision, however, was drafted to apply
in only five specific cases: (1) war, (2) public disaster, (3) agrarian reform, (4)
urban renewal, and (5) energy exploration.7" In all other cases, the framers
decided to uphold the cash requirement, probably as a deterrent to expropriations
not truly based in the social interest.
In the following subsection, we examine the facts of the Peruvian case and
the response of the Inter-American Commission. In making this brief case
study, we hope to illustrate why a new mechanism is needed in order to ensure
that international human rights, and the constitutional guarantees we have
examined thus far, be given practical effect under international law.
C. Banco de Lima: The Facts
On July 28, 1987, a date curiously coinciding with the anniversary of the
Peruvian Independence, President Alan Garcfa appeared on television screens
across the country to announce what he called a "revolutionary measure." His
government had declared that it was in the social interest that the activities of
the banking, investment, and insurance industries be placed under the exclusive
ownership and control of the state.7  Therefore, his government was
I Id. Article 125.
7 oId. The third paragraph of Article 125 provides:
In the case of expropriation due to war, public disaster, agrarian reform, urban
renewal, or energy exploration, the payment of just compensation may be made in
cash, by installments, or in obligatory acceptance bonds of free disposition, only
redeemable in currency. In these cases, the law determines the amount of the
issue, adequate terms of payment, periodically readjustable interest rate, as well as
the portion of the compensation that must be paid in cash and in a pre-established
manner.
71 President Garcia made the announcement during his state of the nation address before the
National Congress. See Peru's Garcia Proposes To Nationalize Banks, Reuter Library Report, Jul.
28, 1987, AM Cycle; Peru President Urges Bank Nationalization: Banks See Isolation, Reuter
Library Report, Jul. 29, 1987, PM Cycle; Peruvian Bank Takeover Dismays Investors, United Press
International, Jul. 29, 1987, AM Cycle. For a transcript of President Garcia's address see British
Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4D, Latin America and Other
(continued...)
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proceeding to expropriate all of the shares of the Peruvian banks, investment
firms, and insurance companies remaining in private hands.'
To Peruvians at large, who had not heard of expropriation since the years
of General Velasco's dictatorship, the news came as a shock.73  To bank
shareholders, small as well as great, the announcement meant that the state was
seizing their property in an act of pure and simple cleptocracy, pickpocketing
disguised as law. However, at least for the time being, there was little they
could do to challenge the measure.
The President's announcement left the shareholders in a very
uncomfortable situation. The bill which set forth the expropiatory scheme in all
its details could take months before being approved by both houses of Congress.
It was expected that the magnitude and nature of the proposed expropriation -
which if enacted would give absolute control of all sources of credit to the
executive branch - would elicit long and emotional congressional debates.74
Moreover, the actual forced transference of corporate control from the banks'
71 ... continued)
Countries, Jul. 30, 1987. Garcia called the nationalization "the most revolutionary measure ever
taken in the history of Peru." See Peru Takes Control of 10 Banks, Financial Institutions,
Washington Post, Jul. 30, 1987, at E3.
I According to official figures, at the time of the announcement the government controlled a
majority of banking operations, giving 82 per cent of all credit and holding 70 per cent of all
deposits. See Washington Post, supra note 71. The nationalization affected 10 private banks, 7
investment firms and 17 insurance companies. It did not include six foreign banks with subsidiaries
in Pern. These banks were Bank of Tokyo Ltd., Citicorp, BankAmerica Corp., Bank of London
and South America Ltd., Banco Central de Madrid, and Chase Manhattan Bank. See United Press
International supra note 71; Bank Nationalization Seen Increasing Peru's Isolation, Reuter Business
Report, Jul. 28, 1987, BC Cycle; Foreign Bank Status in Peri, New York Times, Jul. 30, 1987,
at 6, col. 6.; and Peru Proposes State Ownership of Banks, Financial Times, Jul. 29, 1987, at 1.
73 The military government of General Velasco - which lasted from 1968 to 1975 - engaged in
widespread nationalization of many of the country's economic sectors. Velasco sent the army to
take over the installations of the International Petroleum Company ([PC) - a subsidiary of Standard
Oil - nationalized several important American mining concerns, and expropriated all newspapers,
magazines, radio and television stations. For an account of General Velasco's government see A.
BAELLA, EL PODER INVISIBLE (1978). The IPC filed an action of habeas corpus against the
government challenging the nationalization. A dismissal of the action was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. See Resoluci6n de la Corte Suprema de 3 de Enero de 1969, 96 INFORMATIvo LEGAL
RODRIGO 243 (Opinion of the Supreme Court).
74 Indeed, internal debates had already started. The bank takeover was secretly planned by an
inner circle of officials, two weeks before President Garcia's speech before Congress, and approved
by the Cabinet after an 11-hour debate without prior consultation with party leaders. The
announcement took the leaders by surprise. See Washington Post, Jul. 29, 1987, at Fl. For
instance, Vice-President Luis Alberto Sfuchez learned of the proposed nationalization from former
President Fernando Belainde, on the senate's floor, only two hours before Garcia's state of the
nation address. Mr. Ramiro Prial6, President of the Senate and prominent leader of the President's
party publicly declared that he opposed the idea of the state having an exclusive say on economic
matters. And congressman Alfredo Barnechea simply resigned his membership in the President's
party. Of the 60 voting members of the Senate, 32 belonged to President Garcia's party. Of those
32, only 18 vowed to vote unconditionally in favor of the nationalization. But President Garcia
knew that Senators and Congressmen from the United Left Coalition would support the measure.
See Parches de Cdmara, Revista Si, Aug. 10, 1987, at 6-7.
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shareholders and administrators to the Ministry of Finance -which would
consumate the violation of their right to property - could not take place until the
bill was approved and enacted as law. From a procedural standpoint, and even
though the injury was almost sure to occur, they could not challenge the measure
through an amparo action in the courts of Lima because no actual injury had
taken place or become imminent within the meaning of the amparo law.
Later in his televised speech, however, President Garcfa made the injury
more than imminent, giving the perplexed shareholders the ammunition they
needed to begin their judicial battle. Alleging that the entire banking industry
was in great and severe danger, and that his government had developed an
immediate need to "democratize" credit, President Garcfa announced that he had
issued an executive decree ordering the immediate intervention of all banks,
investment firms and insurance companies.75 The decree fired the bank's
boards of directors and ordered state management teams to take immediate
control of the banks.76 Employees were threatened with administrative action
and prosecution if they did not cooperate with the interventors." The President
warned that police and army forces would be used against employees and
shareholders if they tried to opposse any resistence.
D. Exhausting local Remedies in Peruvian Courts
The day after the President's announcement, the government froze all
banking operations and ordered paramilitary police to surround the banks'
buildings. Government officials ushered by heavily armed riot police took over
the administration of the banks and began auditing their records behind closed
doors.7" Confident of his authoritarian power, and fully backed by the power
of the army, President Garcfa expected a smooth transfer of control. But
shareholders' reaction to the forceful intervention was swift and unexpected.
The legal order was ruptured by the unconstitutional use of force and the
armed imposition of the interventors. The time came to put to the test the
ambitious system for the protection of property rights that the framers of the
constitution had so carefully designed. Shareholders of many banks and
corporations filed amparo actions challenging the unconstitutionality of the
'5 "I hereby announce that while the bill is discussed at the national congress, and in accordance
with the the constitutional right that allows the state to temporarily take control of all economic
activities... the government through a supreme decree issued today has decided on an immediate
state action." See British Broadcasting Corporation, supra note 71 (President Garcia's state of the
nation address).
76 See Chicago Tribune, Jul. 30, 1987, at C5.
7 See United Press International, supra note 71.
7 See Peruvian Banks Do Not Open on First Day of State Control, Reuters Library Reports,
Jul. 30, 1987.
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expropriation before several judges of first instance. Judge Eduardo Raffo Otero
was the first to rule on an amparo action filed by the shareholders.79 Holding
for the claimants, Judge Raffo issued an injunction ordering the executive to
immediately suspend all interventory measures. His ruling came on a late
Friday evening, only hours after a smiling and triumphant President Garcfa, with
constitution in hand, had told foreign reporters that the takeovers were legal.'
The Court's ruling enraged President Garcfa, who angrily defied judicial
authority, declaring that the nationalization was "irreversible" and stating that
the unconstitutional takeovers would proceed no matter what the opposition.8
Armed with the Court's injuction, bank managers and owners returned to their
offices on the morning of Monday August 3, and employees at the Banco
Mercantil began holding a small rally in support of the Court's ruling.'
Faithful to his promise to take over the banks despite judicial opposition,
President Garcfa sent riot police to break the peaceful protest. Police aboard an
armored car mounted with a water cannon fired tear gas and doused some 200
protesters who had done nothing more than exercise their legal rights.'a
The, violent incident turned public opinion against President Garcfa,
compelling the government to obey the court's order and to withdraw from the
banks. On August 7, more than a week after the court declared that the
nationalization was unconstitutional, the President announced his decision to lift
the illegal intervention.' Right after the announcement, however, the Attorney
I The action ruled upon by judge Raffo was filed by Guillermo Wiesse, the owner of Banco
Wiesse (Perd's second largest private bank). See Peru Going Ahead With Bank Takeovers Despite
Judge's Ruling, The Reuter Library Report, Aug. 1, 1987. Other judges followed. Among them
were Judges Jos6 Rodriguez Ayma and Jaime Mor-n Cisneros. See La Batalla Judicial, Caretas,
Sept. 14, 1987, at 18.
o See Judge Suspends Takeover of Banks in Peru, United Press International, Aug. 1, 1987,
AM Cycle. Waving a copy of the Peruvian Constitution, Garcia had ironically declared "I do not
go about armed, this is my only weapon." See Peru Ready For Clash With Bankers, Financial
Times, Aug. 3, 1987, at 18.
81 See Peru Ready for Clash With Bankers, Financial Times, Aug. 3, 1987, See. I, at 18. The
Minister of Finance, Gustavo Saberbein, declared that the government would proceed with the state
takeover despite the injunction issued by Judge Raffo. See Garcia Says Peru's Bank Nationalization
Irreversible, Reuter Business Report, Aug. 3, 1987, BC Cycle.
See Owners Return to Banks in Peru, United Press International, Aug. 3, 1987, AM Cycle.
See Foreign News Briefs, Lima, Peru, United Press International, Aug. 4, 1987, AM Cycle.
(Meanwhile, President Garcia convened an extrordinary Cabinet session to discuss resistance to the
nationalization).
" See Garcia Suspends Government Administration of Private Banks, Reuter Library Report,
Aug. 8, 1987, PM Cycle; Peru Pauses On Way to Bank Seizure, Washington Post, Aug. 8, 1987,
at A26; Peru Suspends Bank Takeover, New York Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at D2, col. 4. President
Garcia declared he had decided to lift control of the banks to avoid giving bankers "a victory so
they can knock on other doors, saying we have violated the constitution and caused the rupture of
the democracy." The very same day he demanded that Congress approve his nationalization bill.
See Peru Lyfs Control of 10 Banks But Garcia Seeks Power To Seize Financial Institutions, Chicago
(continued...)
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General filed an appeal before the Second Civil Chamber of the Superior Court
of Lima challenging Judge Raffo's ruling. The chamber affirmed. Still unhappy
with the Court's ruling, the government attempted to impeach Judge Raffo by
filing an action against him before the Internal Orgap of Control of The
Judiciary. The Organ found that Raffo's conduct had been correct and
dismissed the government's claim.' The Peruvian judiciary, in an historical
show of power, was affirming its independence.
The President, however, had his own reasons for being obedient. At the
time of Judge Raffo's ruling, he was facing mounting popular opposition to his
project of expropriation. Writer Mario Vargas Llosa had aroused the middle
classes and was holding political rallies denouncing the takeovers all across the
country." Even within his own political party Garcfa faced strong dissent.Y
It was only as a matter of strategy that he decided to obey the amparo rulings
and to wait patiently for the expropriation law to be approved. 8 Shouting from
a balcony of the Presidential Palace in the style of Benito Mussolini, a wrathful
President Garcfa thundered: "I want to warn the imbeciles and those that fall
into demagogy that lifting the intervention does not mean to reverse this process.
There will be no reversal of the will to make the financial and credit organisms
(.. .continued)
Tribune, Aug. 11, 1987, at C3. The "other doors" to which President Garcfa alluded were either
the Constitutional Guarantees Court or the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
"5 See Hora Cero, Caretas, Sept. 28, 1987, at 16-18. The Government filed a criminal action
against Judge Juan Rodriguez Ayma accusing him of acting against the executive, the senate, and
the state. Judge Rodriguez, ruling in favor of the bankers, had issued an injunction similar to Judge
Raffo's.
" See A Literary Lion Growls at State Power, Financial Times, Sept. 7, 1987, at 14. Mr.
Vargas Llosa led mass rallies against the takeovers, while the ruling party launched a blitz of
television commercials to denounce him as a political opportunist. Upon announcing his opposition
to the measure, he received threatening phone calls and was forced to put tight security around his
home. Many other prominent political figures were also campaigning against the nationalization.
For instance, Luis Cfceres Velisquez, the mayor of the city of Arequipa (Perd's second largest
city), ordered all flags on public buildings in the city to be flown at half-staff and called on workers
to begin an indefinite strike to battle the measure. See United Press International, supra note 71.
President Garcia also had influential supporters, like President Frangois Miterrand of
France, who announced he would visit Lima in October to solidarize with President Garcia. See
Vargas Llosa Gives Peru Dangerous Plot for Democracy, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 28, 1987, part
2, at 7, col. 1.
s See Revista Sf, supra note 74.
President Garcfa said on a Lima radio station that his decision to lift control of the banks,
rather than a step backwards in the seizure of the banking sector, was a temporary "tactical
strategy" because [his government] "would nationalize the banking sector regardless of cries,
complaints and come what may." See Peru's Garcia on Suspension of Intervention in Private Banks,
British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 11, 1987, Part 4D, Latin
America and Other Countries.
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belong to the people and serve national interests."I Comparing his scheme to
a game of chess, President Garcfa declared at a press conference the following
day: "There are times in which you have to let the other eat a pawn, but we will
take the banks from the right wing. "' The President was not playing the good
citizen; he was looking for the check mate.
While debate over the expropriation bill continued in both houses of
Congress, President Garcfa devised a statutory scheme to block the amparo
actions that the shareholders were bound to file as soon as the bill became a law.
To this end, his party introduced an amendment to law 23506 - the law of
amparo - which was approved by the House of Representatives, where his party
had an absolute majority.91 According to this amendment, no amparo action
11 President Garcia further declared "I am not interested in the intervention, what interests me
is the nationalization of the banks of Perd. The bankers have filed a plea before a judge, but we
have filed one before the people of Perd and we will defend it." He also contradicted himself
declaring that he was "certain that the Superintendency of Banks and Insurance is an autonomous
organization Jthat] will have the means to oversee the functioning of the banks to prevent
irregularities While the law is under discussion." See Garcia Suspends Government Administration
ofPrivate Banks, Reuter Library Report, Aug. 8, 1987, PM Cycle. Garcia had previously declared
that the principal aim of the intervention was to prevent those irregularities, implying that the
Superintendency could not do so. See Washington Post, supra note 71.
Since July 28, 1987, when President Garcia announced the arbitrary nationalization, the
Peruvian media began to portray him as a folkloric neo-Hitler. News pictures showed him shouting
from his balcony in the Presidential Palace with the words "Hell Hitler" at the bottom. See Revista
OIGA, No. 347, Sept. 14, 1987, at 52. On August 11, 1987, the government of President Garcia
ordered all elementary and secondary schools to create "Basic Units for the Youth Military
Commandos of Perd." These commandos were to receive instruction in martial arts. At the same
time, the government started a literacy program in which children and illiterate adults were taught
to recognize the vowels by reciting political slogans. In one book prepared for such purposes,
students learned to read and write by memorizing and writing the slogan "Only God will save my
soul and only APRISMO [President Garcia's political ideology] will save Perd." See Revista OIGA,
No. 348, Sept. 26, 1987, at 36-37.
I See Jaque al Rey: El Presidente Ajedrecista Ante Una Nueva Partida, Revista Si, Aug. 10,
1987, at 3. As a presidential candidate, President Garcia had conclusively asserted that he would
not attempt to nationalize the banking industry because "[a] nationalization of the banks is carried
out in a capricious way . . . it only increases the financial difficulties of the State ... the State
already controls 70% of the system and I do not know if it does so in an efficient way." See
Petition Presented to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by the Shareholders of
Banco de Lima, Mar. 11, 1988, at 3-4. President Garcia had categorically asserted: "We will not
nationalize."
"I See Abuso y Amparo, Revista Si, Aug. 24, 1987, at 23. As noted above, the purpose of the
amparo action is to prevent the violation of any constitutional right not protected by the action of
habeas corpus and to re-establish the status quo prior to the violation or threat or violation. Before
President Garcia introduced his amendment in the lower house, Article 6 of law 23506 provided
that an amparo action would not proceed in only three situations:
1. In cases where the violation or threat of violation of a constitutional right
ceases to exist, or when the violation has become irreparable.
2. Against a judicial resolution emanating from a regular proceeding. [against
res judicata]
3. When the injured party decides to file an ordinary suit [instead of an action
of guarantee such as an amparo action].
For a brief overview of the law of amparo see J.E. BIAGGI G6MEz, EL HABEAS CORPUS EN EL
PERt): LEY, DOCTRINA Y JURISPRUDENCIA (1984). For a more detailed study of the law of amparo
containing a concordance and judicial opinions construing its different aspects see A.J. BALBIN
GUADALUPE, LEY DE HABEAS CORPUS Y AMPARO (ACCiONES DE GARANTfA): CONCORDANCIAS,
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would be allowed to proceed in any of the following two situations:
1. When, for reasons of public necessity or social interest,
declared in accordance to law and in compliance with the
provisions of article 125 of the Constitution, the state
reserves for itself any production or service activity.
2. When in situations of grave crisis or emergency, the state
intervenes into economic activities with transitory measures
of an extraordinary character.
The first part of the amendment was intended to prevent the filing of
amparo actions in cases of expropriation. Thus, the shareholders were being
deprived of a pre-established jurisdiction in violation of article 2 of the
Constitution, and of the only action of guarantee that they could exercise to
defend their legal rights.' The second part of the amendment was intended to
prevent the filing of amparo actions to challenge interventory measures (like the
actions ruled upon by Judge Raffo) whenever the government claimed to be
acting in a crisis or an emergency. Like the initial decree of intervention, this
amendment was also unconstitutional
On Monday, September 28, Francisco Pardo Mesones, President of Banco
Mercantil, announced that he would physically resist the takeover. Mr. Pardo
brought a bed to his bank, and began to sleep in his office. Addressing Mr.
Pardo's challenge, Attorney General Hugo Denegri warned bankers against
defying the imminent takeover even if the nationalization law was "manifestly
[and] radically unconstitutional." According to Mr. Denegri, "anar6hy" would
result if the bankers disobeyed.93 Mr. Pardo disagreed and kept the vigil in his
bank.
That same day, after four weeks and 150 hours of heated debate, the
senate approved the unconstitutional takeover. The lower house held a marathon
all-night session to give its final approval to the senate's draft on the early
COMENTARIOS, JURISPRUDENCIA (1985). For a an in-depth study of the origins, history and
development of the amparo action see D. GARCIA BELAfJNDE, EL HABEAS CORPUS EN EL PERU
(1979) (although the text deals with the action of habeas corpus, that action served the purposes of
the amparo action prior to the signing of the 1979 Constitution).
9 Article 2(20)(L) reads in relevant part : "No person may be deprived of a jurisdiction
previously established by law nor be subject to procedures different from the ones already
established." See CoNsTrrucI6N POLfTICA DEL PERO (1979).
9 See Defiance of Bank Takeover would 'ignite anarchy'Peru Says, United Press International,
Sept. 30, 1987, BC Cycle.
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morning of September 29.14 Ignoring, however, the swiftness displayed by his
party-controlled Congress in the passage of the bill, the President postponed
signing it into law for two weeks in order to avoid embarrassing protests during
the overnight visit of French President Frangois Miterrand, scheduled to take
place on Saturday, October 10. But as soon as President Miterrand's plane took
off from Lima's International Airport on Sunday 11, President Garcfa rushed to
sign the unconstitutional takeover into law and to order the forceful and
immediate taking of the banks.9"
Upon learning that the President had signed the bill, Mr. Pardo Mesones
announced that he was ready to defend his property to the end. Mr. Pardo
declared that if President Garcfa wanted him to leave his office, he would have
to drag him out.96 Other bankers, following Mr. Pardo's example, began to
sleep in their offices and hired professional security forces to oppose any
governmental attempt to invade their office buildings. Employees rallied around
their bosses and locked themselves inside the buildings in support of the
resistance.' The atmosphere became tense, and people felt the winds of war.
Shortly after Mr. Pardo's declaration, an angry President Garcfa ordered
hundreds of paramilitary forces to surround and take the main office buildings
of Banco de Cr~dito and Banco Wiesse, Peri's two largest banks. Hurling tear
gas and using tanks and rifle butts, the forces bashed their way into the banks,
where shareholders and employers were opposing the expropriation, and
installed new teams of interventors sent to take control.9 Helmeted riot police
9 See Peru's Bank Takeover Law is Passed, Financial Times, Sept. 30, 1987, § 1, at 4;
Peruvian Congress Approves Takeover of Banks, Reuter Business Report, Sept. 29, 1987, BC
Cycle; Peru is Closer to BankLaw, New York Times, Sept. 30, 1987, at D28-, col. 3 (late city final
ed.). The senate's draft declared the banks in a "situation of emergency" and ordered their
immediate seizurebefore the courts could finish the relevant appraisals and determine compensation.
See Brief United Press International, Sept. 30, 1987, PM Cycle.
95 See Peru's Banks Nationalization Law Comes Into Effect, Reuter Business Report, Oct. 12,
1987, BC Cycle; Peru's Banks Nationalized, New York Times, Oct 12, 1987, at D8, col. 6 (late
city final ed.).
Mr. Pardo challenged the unconstitutional expropriation announcing: "My bank is not for sale
and I will not leave voluntarily. They will have to carry me out." Durr, Peru's Nationalization of
Banks Shakes Business Confidence, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 13, 1987, at 11. Right after
starting his vigil on the eve of the bill's passage, Mr. Pardo became the center of national attention,
a folkloric new kind of "pin-striped freedom fighter" who fascinated his country. His grandfather,
Jos6 Pardo, had been President of Peril from 1904 to 1908 and from 1915 to 1919, when pro-
American President Augusto B. Legufa ousted him from office on the fourth of July. Young Mr.
Pardo announced that he would also enter politics "because it's the only way to fight." Pin Striped
Rebels Defy Takeover of Peru's Banks, Financial Times, Oct. 19, 1987, § 1, at 46.
1 See Peruvian Police Break Down Bank Doors, Reuter Library Report, Oct. 15, 1987, PM
Cycle.
I See Peru Seizes Banks With Tanks, Financial Times, Oct. 16, 1987, § I, at 1; Reuter World
News Highlight, Reuter Library Report, Oct. 15, 1987; Peruvian Police Break Down Bank Doors,
Reuter Library Report, Oct. 15, 1987.
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smashed teller windows and swung rubber clubs at terrified employees.99
Several reporters, employees, and shareholders were injured in the process, and
news pictures of the tanks smashing through the bank's doors appeared in
newspapers and on television screens all over the world.
On October 22, eight days after the violent bank seizure, Judge Jaime
Mordn Cisneros issued an injunction declaring that the expropriation was
unconstitutional and ordering state interventors and paramilitary forces to
immediately withdraw from the banks." ° In a show of judicial power, Judge
Mordn left his chambers and, with his own Court order in hand, forced police
to leave the banks. The Supreme Court, accusing Judge Mordn of indecorous
behavior, summarily dismissed him and replaced him with another judge. The
new magistrate immediately declared Judge Mordn's injunction null and
void.1° I
At this point, prospects for relief from the Peruvian courts appeared dim.
Of the five judges who made up the Second Civil Chamber of the Supreme
Court, four were conspicuous supporters of President Garcfa's party."° These
judges were expected to overrule the amparo rulings that had favored the
shareholders. Even if the case ended up in a different chamber of the Supreme
Court, and a favorable ruling was obtained, President Garcfa could still appeal
that decision to the Constitutional Guarantees Court, where six of its nine
members were also keen supporters of his party. 3
D. Violating the Peruvian Constitution
President Garcfa's initial decree of intervention was unconstitutional on
its face. At no time had the framers contemplated that the executive could
engage in an actual, selective, and defacto expropriation of the whole banking
industry prior to the enactment of the corresponding law in accordance with the
constitution. Allowing such kind of expropriation would contradict article 125,
9' See British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4D, Latin
America and Other Countries, Oct. 16, 1987; Peru Nationalizes Banks, American Banker, Oct. 14,
1987, at 3.
10o See Ruling Challenges Peru's Grip on Banks, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 23, 1987, at Cll;
Judge Overturns Peru Bank takeovers, United Press International, Oct. 22, 1987.
"I See Setback for Peru Bankers as Key Judge is Dismissed, Financial Times, Oct. 29, 1987,
§ I, at 5.
102 See Caretas, supra note 79. The members of the chamber were Chief Justice Eloy Espinoza
Saldafia and associate justices Carlos Castafieda Lafontaine, Edmundo Manrique Dfaz, and Javier
Urquiza Vargas. The only justice considered to be independent was Josd Antonio Silva Vallejo.
11 Id. The high magistrates were Chief Justice Mario Peliez BazAn and associatejustices H&ctor
Centuri6n Vallejo, Hdctor Dfaz Valdivia, Jorge Le6n Seminario, Alfredo Corso Macfas, and Luis
Angel Valenzuela.
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which requires the existence of a clearly proven social interest behind any
expropiatory measure and that payment of just compensation be made prior to
any transfer of control." ° Furthermore, although the Constitution allows for
interventory measures in certain cases, expropriation is not one of them. In
providing for interventory measures, the framers had intended to grant the state
in general - not the executive in particular - authority to intervene the economic
activity in cases of grave crisis or national emergency. President Garcfa argued
first that his aim was to protect and ensure the integrity of the banking industry -
which, according to him, was in a state of grave emergency - while the bill of
expropriation was debated in the Congress. But the banking industry was far
from being in a state of emergency. By the end of the prior fiscal year, all
private banks had shown profits, and President Garcfa himself had praised the
excellent state of the economy during his July 28 state of the nation address.105
Even if the banking industry were in a state of grave emergency, it would have
been the government's responsibility that precipitated it, for at the time the bill
was introduced, the state already controlled 75 per cent of all banking
operations. 0 6 The President simply could not explain why his government
was unable to "democratize" credit nothwithstanding its near monopoly of the
country's banking industry.
President Garcfa also argued that the intervention was necessary both to
prevent a flight of foreign currency and to protect savings. Those concerns,
however, could have been easily addressed. The Superintendency of Banks and
Insurance (an independent government agency) could issue the necessary
regulations in order to protect them. The framers had empowered the
Superintendency with full authority to regulate all banks, investment firms and
insurance companies. 117 Indeed, no arbitrary expropriation was needed.
Furthermore, the measure created an unconstitutional state monopoly over
the banking and insurance industries. Dr. Chirinos Soto, 6ne of the most
influential framers of the constitution and also a prominent member of the
President's party, stated in his annotations to the constitution that the intent of
the framers had been to prevent a state monopoly of the banking industry.
Commenting Article 153, which prohibits the establishment of monopolies, Dr.
1'4 See CoNsTITUcI6N POLtrICA DEL PERfr (1979), Article 125.
105 See British Broadcasting Corporation, supra note 71 (President Garcia's state of the nation
address).
11 See Chicago Tribune, Aug. 24, 1987, See. 1 (News), at 5. (Garcia accused of being greedy
for wanting control of the 25 per cent of the banking industry remaining in private hands); United
Press International, Aug. 1, 1987, AM Cycle (Government's control of 75 per cent of banking
activity makes a takeover of private banks unnecessary); Wise, Peru: Economic Wonders, Political
Ills, XXI NACLA Report on the Americas, May-June 1987, at 8 "[E]ven before the bank takeovers,
the government controlled 80% of all credit"; See also Washington Post, supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
107 See CONsTrrUCI6N POLITICA DEL PERO (1979) Article 155.
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Chirinos wrote: "The day the state takes over the banking industry we will
easily descend into a totalitarian state . . . The day it becomes necessary to
obtain state approval even for an overdraft, the government will have all of us
on our knees.""1 ' Indeed, no constitutional provision could justify the
establishment of a state monopoly and the arbitrary taking of the banks.
In mid-November, 1987, the Courts sent to each of the shareholders of
Banco de Lima a notice of expropriation informing them that expropriation
proceedings had been initiated and summoning them individually to appear in
Court. The notice was not accompanied of any appraisal of the value of the
shares, and the shareholders challenged the validity of the proceedings because
of the lack of such appraisal. By this time, with a government-proposed
amendment to the amparo law which deprived them of the last and only remedy
they had in the internal jurisdiction, international law appeared to be the sole
remaining source of protection for the shareholders.
COMPLAINT BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
On March 11, 1988, 105 individual shareholders of the Banco de Lima
filed a petition against the Peruvian Government before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.0 9 The petition requested that the Commission
issue a resolution declaring that the Peruvian Government had violated:
1. Articles 8, 24 and 25 of the American Convention "by
selectively denying petitioners and others prompt, simple and
effective recourse to the courts of Peril as previously
established by law. ... " [that is, by modifying the amparo
law to deprive the shareholders of a pre-established
jurisdiction].,' 0
2. Article 21 [The human right to the enjoyment of property],
"by wrongfully decreeing the intervention of Banco de Lima
and taking action to expropriate the shares of Banco de Lima
without any justification in the social interest as defined in
the convention and in the [Peruvian] Constitution. "
See E. CHImos SOTO, supra note 22, at 156-7.
109 The Commission's resolution in the case of Banco de Lima was not published in the Inter-
American Commission's 1989 Annual Report to the OAS General Assembly. See Case 10,169
(PERU), Resolution No. 16/89, OEA/Ser.L/V/II/75 Doc.33, April 14, 1989. All referencesmade
in the text to the shareholders' complaint are contained in this single resolution, which is cited in
full in the appendix to this article.
n See, Revista Sf, supra note 74, and accompanying text.
There was no social interest justification for the expropriation. President Garcia was using
the concept to polarize the society into a war between bankers and the poor.
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3. Article 21, "by wrongfully decreeing the intervention of
Banco de Lima and taking action to expropriate the shares
of Banco de Lima in other than in the cases and according
to the forms provided in Peruvian law."
4. Article 21, "by wrongfully threatening to take the shares of
Banco the Lima after selectively changing the rules for
determining compensation to the detriment of Banco de Lima
shareholders,"'
The petition asked the Commission to resolve that the Peruvian Government:
1. "immediately comply with all outstanding court orders
relating to the decreed intervention of Banco de Lima and
the threatened expropriation of its shares; and
2. it "cease and desist from expropriating the shares of Banco
de Lima."
After initial screening, the Commission's Secretariat sent a request of
information on the facts of the case to the Peruvian Government. The Peruvian
Government transmitted its answer to the Commission, without challenging the
facts. The government's answer stated in essence that the expropriation law was
in accordance with the Peruvian Constitution and with article 21 of the American
Convention.
More than a year after the shareholders presented their petition, and
having denied their repeated requests for precautionary measures to protect their
rights until the case was decided, the Commission declared their petition
inadmissible, stating that it could not assert subject matter jurisdiction over the
rights of juridical beings: "The Commission considers that what is at issue here
are not the individual property rights of the individual shareholders, but rather
the collective rights of the company, the Banco de Lima, and that this case is not
within the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights."
Since corporations do not have human rights, the Commission reasoned, there
was no jurisdiction.
With the stroke of a pen, and without analyzing the provisions of the
American Convention upon which it was relying to dismiss the complaint, the
Commission left the shareholders without a remedy and at the mercy of high
local tribunals utterly controlled by President Garcfa's party. Moreover, since
the Peruvian Government had not even bothered to challenge the facts set out
1'2 A government's initial appraisal was done on purpose on the basis of the financial statements
that had been issued the prior year. Since at the time the devaluation index was nearing one
hundred per cent per year, the government's method of appraisal virtually confiscated half of the
banks' assets.
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in the complaint, the Commission was obliged by its statute and regulations to
presume them as true. 113 Why, then, dit it dismiss the complaint?
V. CRITIQUE OF THE COMMISSION'S RULING
A. On Procedural Grounds
Many hypotheses can be built around this contradictory Commission
resolution in a case that clearly required its swift and forceful intervention. First
and based on the chronology of the case as set out by the Commission itself, it
could be asserted that the dismissal of the shareholders' claim was motivated by
political considerations. The Commission's reasoning was simplistic and devoid
of analysis. If Article 1(2) of the American Convention was applicable to the
case in such a direct and clear way, it is difficult to understand why the
Commission took more than one year to pronounce itself on the admissibility of
the claim.114
The initial request for information was sent to the Peruvian Government
on March 17, 1988. The first request for precautionary measures made by the
shareholders at a hearing before the Commission en banc was denied on the
grounds that the Peruvian Government had not yet filed an answer to the
shareholders' complaint and that an order for precautionary measures would
involve an examination of the merits, which the Commission was not allowed
to do as of that moment. At no time was a jurisdictional barrier even mentioned
by the Commission, even though such an observation did not require an
examination of the merits of the case.
In fact, the Commission could have issued the precautionary measures
requested by the shareholders at the very beginning of the proceedings.
According to Commission Regulation 29(2) and well settled principles of
international law, the granting of precautionary measures does not imply a
decision on the merits of the case. Their purpose is to act as a temporary
injunction to protect the rights set forth in the Convention while the case is
decided. Indeed, the Inter-American Court, acting on a petition submitted by
a group of journalists, recognized this principle in a case involving the Peruvian
government. 115 In that case, the request for precautionary measures was made
" ,See Article 42, Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Approved
by the Commission at its 660th Meeting, 49th Session, April 8, 1980, and amended on March 7,
1985, at the Commission's 64th Session.
I" Indeed, Article 1(2) of the American Convention is a simple and straightforward provision.
It reads: "For the purposes of this Convention, 'person' means every human being."
"5 See Order of Aug. 8, 1989, on the granting of Precautionary Measures by the Inter-
American Court in the Case of Peruvian journalists Hugo Bustfos Saavedra and Eduardo Rojas Aree
(Available from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington, D.C.)
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together with the initial petition. The Court did not wait until the government
responded. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice recognized the same
principle, holding that a decision on provisional measures "in no way prejudges
the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the cases
or any questions relating to the merits themselves. 
116
After refusing even to consider precautionary measures until the
government of Perti responded to the shareholders'complaint, the Commission
then stood with folded arms for seven months following the filing of the
government's answer. Again, if Article 1(2) seemed so clear in defining that
shareholders of a corporation were not humans and therefore did not have any
human rights, why did the Commission fail to raise its jurisdictional objection
either at the outset of the proceedings or at the en banc hearing where mention
to the nature of the shareholders' claim was repeatedly made by the attorney of
record?
17
B. On Substantive Grounds
Giving the Commission the benefit of the doubt, it could be asserted that
its performance in the Peruvian case is an example of its incapacity to deal with
cases involving careful analysis and interpretation of the American Convention.
As Professors Newman and Weissbrodt affirm regarding the work of the
Commission,
Cases requiring sophisticated interpretation of rights in human
rights instruments. . . are not typical of the work pursued by the
Inter-American Commission . . . most individual petitions filed
with the Commission allege conduct that applicable instruments
clearly prohibit such as torture or arbitrary drrest and
imprisonment. In the typical case the main issue for the
Commission to decide is whether the alleged ill-treatment actually
took place. If the Commission establishes the truth of the
allegations, it can easily find violations of human rights
provisions.11
116 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 23
I.L.M. 468, 477 (1984).
"7 The hearing was held on September 14, 1988. At this hearing, the shareholders requested
the granting of precautionary measures. The Commission denied their request on the grounds that,
"no such decision may be taken without reference to the merits of the complaint, and such decision
would be premature since the Government of Perd has yet to present its response on the matter."
The Government filed its response soon thereafter, and its answer was transmitted to the
shareholders on September 21, 1988, only seven days after the hearing of September 14.
118 See Newman & Weissbrodt, supra note 61, at 272.
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Not so in the Peruvian case. This typical approach presents a severe
contrast with the unusual situation involving the shareholders' claim, where the
Peruvian Government did not dispute the facts but challenged the meaning of
Article 21. Determining whether the affected shareholders' had human rights
within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the American Convention required the kind
of sophisticated treaty interpretation and analysis which the Commission was
neither qualified nor experienced to perform. It was a task more proper to the
stature and qualifications of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Indeed,
the Commission itself so concluded and decided to submit the case to the Inter-
American Court for its interpretation on the question of admissibility. In a letter
dated January 19, 1989, the Commission informed the shareholders that it had
decided to transfer the case to the Court.119 In early April, however, the staff
of the Commission informed the shareholders that the Commission had decided
not to submit the case to the Court and that it was proceeding to declare the
petition inadmissible. What occurred in the interim? What caused the
Commission's radical change of mind?
Furthermore, the Commission's absurd reading of Article 21 penalized the
shareholders for exercising one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Convention. Article 16 protects the right of association establishing that,
"Everyone has the right to associate freely for.., economic.., purposes""12
That is precisely what the shareholders had done by creating a corporation.
They had pulled their resources together and associated with each other to create
a bank. Now, the Commission was telling them that, because they had
exercised their right of association, because they had decided to become
shareholders, they had ceased to be humans and, therefore, did not have human
rights. Indeed, the Commission's reasoning could not have been more flawed.
Had the case reached the Court, what would the Court had done with it?
Perhaps we could venture a little on the analysis that the Inter-American Court
would probably have made of Article 1(2) of the American Convention. First,
it would probably have read the article in question in conjunction with Article
21 and other relevant provisions on treaty interpretation in order to determine
whose rights was Article 21 intended to protect. Under Article 29, no provision
of the American Convention, such as Article 1(2), can be interpreted to restrict
"the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the
laws of any State Party." The Peruvian Constitution recognized the right to the
enjoyment of property as applicable to every individual under its jurisdiction.
119 See Letter of January 19, 1989, sent to the shareholders' attorney by Mr. Edmundo Vargas
Carrefio, Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In this letter,
Mr. Vargas Carrefio stated: "The Commission did ...agree, in principle, to seek an advisory
opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the matter raised in your petition..
. The outcome of this process will be communicated to you once the court has responded." The
Commission did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the case, for it had already decided to seek an
advisory opinion from the Inter- American Court and had duly notified the parties.
12 See American Convention, supra note 18.
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By denying that right to the Shareholders of Banco de Lima, the Commission
was violating this cardinal rule of interpretation. Article 1(2) and Article 21
could not be interpreted to restrict the right to property to those who fit the
Commission's cryptic definition of a "human being."
Furthermore, in several of its opinions, The Inter-American Court, "has
used the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention as its sole guide for
construing the American Convention. "1' The Vienna Convention provides
that recourse may be had to the preparatory work of the treaty whenever direct
interpretation "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.""
The simplistic interpretation undertaken by the Inter-American Commission led
it to an absurd and unreasonable result. The Commission either did not consult
the preparatory work of the American Convention or did consult it but decided
to ignore it. Predictably, the Court would have resorted to the travaux
pr4paratoires of the American Convention before jumping on its tracks and
declaring that there was no jurisdiction.
1. The Travaux Prparatoires
A careful examination of the travaux pr~paratoires of the American
Convention would have revealed to the Court that the drafters of Article 21
intended to protect collective property rights such as those of the shareholders
in the case of Banco de Lima. As may be recalled, the amendment proposed by
the Brazilian delegation contained a clause specifying that payment of cash
compensation should not be required from the expropriating state in cases of
land reform. In a subsequent amendment proposal the Brazilian government
alluded to other measures such as the expropriation of large national industries
engaged in the exploitation of key natural resources. As is revealed in practical
experience, large land holdings and key national industries are rarely owned by
a single individual. Even for the sake of an individual owner's convenience, a
corporation is sometimes formed. A strict and simplistic interpretation of
Article 1(2), such as the one made by the Inter-American Commission, would
lead to an absurd result. It would amount to conclude that the Brazilian
delegate, and his colleagues in Costa Rica, intended that payment of just
compensation, in whatever form was contemplated, be made only to individual
property owners and not to corporations, therefore discriminating against the
latter's shareholders. Such conclusion, beyond presenting a serious contradiction
with the Commission's jurisprudence, is clearly illogical and contrary to the
spirit of the American Convention.
121 Newman & Weissbrodt, supra note 61, at 290-91.
1, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, T.S. No. 58 (1980), 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969), entered into force Jan. 27, 1980. Article 32(b).
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Indeed, if Article 21 was not intended to protect the rights of corporate
shareholders, why was the Brazilian delegate proposing an amendment to
provide for payment in bonds? Why did he say that his proposal was intended
to be a response to those who criticized the right to property as representing an
obstacle to agrarian reform? The very purpose of agrarian reform is to
eliminate high concentration in the ownership of lands in the hands of national
and foreign corporations. Such is the case of Guatemala, where the United Fruit
Co. owns large portions of the country. The Brazilian delegate's proposal
revealed a deep concern about a potential financial hardship that payment of cash
compensation could impose on the developing states. This concern could not
have originated in a fear of not being able to pay cash compensation to small
farmers. In comparison, if the Government of Guatemala were to nationalize
the holdings of United Fruit today, it would probably be unable to pay cash
compensation. In such an event, payment in bonds would provide the
government with a reasonable means of meeting its international obligation to
compensate the expropriated corporations.
2. The European Commission
Since the Peruvian Case was a case of first impression, the Inter-
American Court, in addition to examining the travaux prdparatoires of the
American Convention, would also have reviewed the experience of more
developed human rights systems in order to ascertain how they had coped with
the issue presented by the shareholders' claim. Such review would in all
probability have taken it to relevant decisions made by the European
Commission on Human Rights, where the argument made by the Inter-American
Commission to dismiss the shareholders' claim had long been rejected. As early
as 1962, the European Commission had held that a shareholder in a corporation
may, at least if he holds a substantial majority of the shares, be regarded as a
'victim' of alleged breaches of Article I (the right to property) in respect of the
corporation:
[E]ven if under Austrian law only the company as such would be
entitled to take legal action in regard to the applicant's complaint
.. the Applicant is to be considered a victim, within the meaning
of Article 25 . . . of the alleged violations of Article 1 of the
Protocol; . . . in this respect the Commission has had particular
regard to the fact that about 91 % of the shares in the company
were held by the applicant."z
Furthermore, the Brazilian delegate to the American Convention, like
Professor Garcfa-Amador, had linked Article 21 of the American Convention to
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention, without making any
12 Application 1706/62 (1962).
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distinction whatsoever between legal and natural persons.124 The delegate's
reference to Article 1 of the European Convention is indeed illuminating, for it
further shows that the delegates to the American Convention intended to protect
the rights of corporate shareholders. Article 1 of the First Protocol of the
European Convention explicitly states that,
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law."
The text of the article begins with a statement of entitlement to legal as
well as natural persons. The Brazilian delegate was well aware of this basic
principle. He linked the European and American provisions in the context of
a comparative study. Corporations are legal or juridical persons. Clearly, their
shareholders have a right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property within the
meaning of the European Convention. Indeed, in 1982, there were at least nine
cases involving corporations before the European Commission on Human
Rights." . These cases had arisen out of the 1977 nationalization of the
Shipbuilding and Aerospace industries in the United Kingdom. Nearly all the
petitioners were British corporate shareholders complaining against their own
state. Their complaints were not dismissed."7 They were all humans, despite
their status as shareholders. Now, if these shareholders were to change their
nationality to become Peruvian citizens, would they still have the same "human"
124 See Comparative Study of the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of the Draft Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights, INTER-AMERICAN YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1968), at 200. (prepared by the
Rapporteur for the subject, Dr. Carlos Dunshee de Abranches, Member of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights) Mr. Dunshee de Abranches stated,
Protection of the individual right of private property... against possible abuses
by the State or its agencies, continues to be an international as well as a domestic
need. The European Convention took up such protection under the formula that
each individual has the right to his property, except in cases of expropriation for
a public use or in those cases provided for by legislation concerning the use of
property in accordance with the interest of all (article 1 of the First Protocol,
paragraph 1).
12s See European Convention, supra note 19.
11 See R. Higgins, The Taking of Property by The State: Recent Development in International
Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COUS 364 (1982).
127 See, e.g., Application No 9266181, 30 EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
DECISIONS AND REPORTS 155 (1983). Evaluating the applicants' standing, the Commission held:
The applicants submit that where a company is deprived of its possessions, then its
shareholders, collectively and individually, must also have been deprived and
therefore are "victims" . . . The Commission has already held in application No.
1706/62 that shareholders can be considered victims of wrongs done to their
companies. The applicant in that case held about 91% of the shares in the
company, but the proportion of the shareholding could only affect the operation of
the principle if it was at a level that could be regarded as de minimis. The
substance of the three applicants' rights is no less affected here than in the previous
case.
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rights? No scientific genius is needed to realize that a shareholder, or any other
human being for that matter, does not cease to be human because of his
nationality. The most basic principle underlying international human rights law
is that human rights have no nationality. They go with the individual wherever
he goes. Why then did the Inter-American Commission dismiss the Peruvian
shareholders' claim?
3. The International Court of Justice
An examination of the general principles of international law, as recently
interpreted and developed in the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice, would also have taken the Inter-American Court to a more enlightening
conclusion. In the recent decision in the case of Eletronnica Siccula v. Raytheon
(Italy v. United States), a special chamber of the Court led by President Ruda
changed its long held position regarding claims made by states on behalf of
corporations, which it had asserted in the celebrated Barcelona Tractions
Case. 
128
In Barcelona,129 the court denied standing to the United States, which
was asserting a claim on behalf of American shareholders in a Belgian
corporation who where suffering deprivation of their property rights by the
Government of Spain. The Court reasoned then that, since a corporation is a
juridical being, and the one in question had been incorporated under the laws of
Belgium, the United States could not attempt to exercise diplomatic protection
on behalf of the American shareholders because the entity whose rights were
being affected was not an American citizen but a Belgian corporation. The
Americans shareholders, like the Peruvians in their own country, were left
without a remedy under an anachronistic but analogous principle.
In Eletronnica Siccula, however, the United States filed a claim with the
Court on behalf of a group of American shareholders in two corporations,
Raytheon and Machlett, whose Italian subsidiary was being affected by a
requisition ordered by the Government of Italy. A chamber of the court ignored
11 See Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy) 1989 I.C.J. 15, reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 1109 (1989). In his separate opinion, Judge Oda noted that, in initiating the proceedings,
the United States had espoused the cause of its nationals (Raytheon and Machlett) as shareholders
in an Italian corporation, ELSI, whereas as the Court itself had determined in Barcelona, the rights
of shareholders as such lie beyond the reach of diplomatic protection under general international
law. For an analysis of the admissibility of the claim in the ELSI Case, see Palenzuela, The
International Court ofJustice and the Standing of Corporate Shareholders Under InternationalLaw:
Elettronica Sicula v. Raytheon (U.S. v. Italy), 1 U. MIAmI Y.B. INT'L L. (infra this issue); See also
Stern, La protection diplomatique des investisseurs internationeaux: De Barcelona Traction a
Elettronica Sicula ou les glissements progressifs de l'analyse, 4 JOURNAL DU DROrr
INTERNATIONAL 897 (1990).
1 See Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd. (New
Application: 1962) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Second Phase).
[VOL. I
The Protection of Property Rights
the holding in Barcelona, acknowledging by implication that, when a majority
of the shares is owned by shareholders on whose behalf a nation is exercising
its right of diplomatic protection, the shareholders - not the corporation - are to
be regarded as the victims of the expropriation. In granting standing to the U.S.
and its American shareholders, the.ICJ Chamber was embracing a principle
analogous to the one applied in the human rights context by the European
Commission of Human Rights.
A. The Inter-American Court: A Possible Solution
Undoubtedly, the case would have come out differently had the
Commission decided to submit the case to the Court. And this realization poses
another critical question in our analysis. Did the case really require so
sophisticated an interpretation that the Commission was in fact unable to
perform? Article 34 of the American Convention requires that Commission
members be "persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the
field of human rights."1" While the reference to "recognized competence"
creates a broad and perhaps flexible standard, it also implies that Commission
members must have at least the capacity to engage in careful analysis of basic
human rights instruments such as the American Convention. It is possible that
the Commission, acting in good faith, might have seriously mistaken the terms
in which the right to property is established in the American Convention. The
evidence we have examined thus far, however, sadly leads us to a different
conclusion.
The rejection of the claim presented by the shareholders of Banco de Lima
shows one of the most serious deficiencies of the Inter-American Commission:
its vulnerability to external political considerations. The Commission evidently
lost its objectivity at some point in the proceedings, or perhaps'even before that.
A prominent member of President Garcfa's party stated in an interview with the
Peruvian magazine Caretas, long before the shareholders petition was filed, that
the Commission had already decided that it would not give course to an action
presented by the shareholders."' The Commission's Secretary made similar
statements to the attorneys on the case on numerous occasions during the
proceedings. Indeed, it seems that the case was decided even before it was
filed.
The decision in the Peruvian case raises serious doubts about the
impartiality of the Commission in future cases. If this unjust ruling is not
questioned and measures are not taken to correct the problem, the only thing the
Commission would have to do to rid itself of a petition not in tune with its
130 See American Convention, supra note 18.
131 See Reflexiones Sobre la Banca, Caretas, Sept. 28, 1987, at 26 (Interview with Senator
Javier Valle Riestra).
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political wave would be to declare it inadmissible on some unreasonable ground.
The high level of abstraction present in every article of the American
Convention empowers the Commission with the means to misinterpret its
provisions with relative impunity. At first glance, the Commission's reasoning
seems to be reasonable: The Convention protects human beings, banks are not
human beings, therefore the convention does not protect banks. But there is
more to human rights than simple syllogisms. Unless we are willing to tolerate
such shoddy reasoning, we must suggest that changes be made to eliminate the
possibility of future injustices such as the one evidently committed against the
shareholders in the Peruvian case.
It has already been suggested that the Commission itself should improve
its legal analysis.'32  The suggestion, however, implies the Commission's
willingness to undertake such improvement. The shareholders' case shows that
the Commission does not possess that will. That it does not becomes even more
evident when we realize that Peni had recognized the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court. At the very least, the Commission, had it had the
will to do justice, would have submitted the case to the Court. It did not have
to undertake difficult analysis of legal issues by itself. The record shows that
there had been some difference of opinion at the heart of the Commission on the
issue of admissibility. The Commission initially decided to submit the case to
the Court but then opted to reject the petition. As unfortunate as it may seem,
the decision shows that if improvement in the analysis of the American
Convention is to take place, it must come from the Inter-American Court, not
from the Commission.
B. Towards a New Mechanism
One of the most important powers entrusted by the American Convention
to the Inter-American Court is that of interpreting all of its provisions. Article
64 of the Convention provides in relevant part that,
1. The Member states of the Organization may consult the
Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of
other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in
the American States (emphasis added)."'
The reference to "other treaties" suggests the pervasive scope of the
Court's advisory jurisdiction. For instance, Professor Buergenthal has argued
that the Court "might look to the catalog of rights found in the principal
132 See D. Shelton, Improving Human Rights Protections: Recommendationsfor Enhancing the
Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of Hwnan Rights, 3 AM.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 323 (1988).
I See American Convention, supra note 18.
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international and regional human rights instruments and in the constitutions of
the states constituting the Inter-American System" in order to define the meaning
of "human rights." 1" This argument has important implications for the
Peruvian case, for it would probably have led the Court to examine the property
provisions of the European Convention in order to determine whose rights was
Article 21 of the American Convention intended to protect. Moreover, the
Court itself has held that it possesses authority to render advisory opinions
interpreting the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, holding
that "the fact that the Declaration is not a treaty does not thus import the
conclusion that it lacks legal effect, nor is the Court prevented from interpreting
it . "... 1135
Individuals like the Peruvian shareholders, however, do not have access
to the Court. Furthermore, the Commission is not required to submit a case to
the Court, even when the case presents difficult legal issues. The problem lies
at this precise stage of the proceedings. If the Commission finds the case to be
contrary to its political opinion, it has wide discretion to reject it as it did in the
Peruvian case. On the contrary, if the Commission had the obligation to submit
to the Court (for interpretation purposes only) all cases requiring interpretation -
as opposed to direct application - of provisions in the American Convention,
or in the American Declaration, the possibility of the Commission's political
considerations affectihig its analysis of important legal issues would be greatly
reduced, if not eliminated. Granting individual petitioners the right to request
that specific treaty provisions be submitted to the Court for its interpretation in
an advisory opinion would strengthen the protection of human rights within the
system without violating the principle that individual petitioners must not be
given direct access to the Court. Furthermore, it would provide the judges of
the Court, seldom consulted under the present regulations, with the opportunity
to clarify the meaning of the American Convention in well supported advisory
opinions. Finally, it would probably create the need for a full time Inter-
American Court, eliminating the undesirable image of an ad-hoc judicial body
that the present Court has as a result of its statute.
A final suggestion we could make, but nevertheless an important one, is
that the Commission should be required by the General Assembly to publish all
its resolutions, as unimportant as they might seem, in the Commission's Annual
Report to the General Assembly. This report should in turn be made available
to the public. Undoubtedly, publication of all its resolutions will increase the
Commission's accountability to the people of the American States in the
fulfillment of its mandate and will deter the issuing of patently unreasonable
134 Buergenthal, supra note 17, at 4.
1s Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in the context
of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (1989)(translated from Spanish).
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rulings such as the one we have studied in this article. For obvious reasons, the
Commission did not include its resolution in the Peruvian case in its 1989
Annual Report to the General Assembly. It waited two years, till February 22,
1991, to publish the resolution, originally titled "Resolution 16/89," as "Report
10/91. " The Commission excused itself in a footnote claiming that it had
decided to publish the resolution "in light of the fact the petitioners in this case
desisted in their request for a reconsideration of the decision." There should be
no more skeletons in the Commission's closet.
VII. CONCLUSION
Three years after President Alan Garcfa made his unfortunate
announcement on Perd's Independence Day, President Alberto Fujimori, during
his July 1990 inaugural address, announced that his party would submit a bill to
abrogate the infamous nationalization law enacted by the government of
President Garcfa.136 President Fujimori declared that the law had only "helped
to create a pointless atmosphere of confusion and instability," and that he and
the members of his party would "study means and ways truly to democratize
credit mechanisms, but without saddling the state with additional agencies and
bureaucracy." For three consecutive years, President Garcfa had purposefully
failed to repeal the law, waiting perhaps for a future opportunity to enforce it.
Indeed, the shareholders of Banco de Lima were not saved by the
Commission, nor by President Alberto Fujimori. The Damocles sword of
expropriation remained suspended over their heads for those three consecutive
years. They were saved by the fierce and decisive opposition to the
unconstitutional deprivation of their rights made by bankers like Mr. Francisco
Pardo, by the courageous action taken by the judges of the lower courts of
Lima, and by the many people who rose their voices to defend them in the
streets of Perdi under the banner of liberty. President Garcfa, although in
control of both chambers of Congress and fully backed by the power of the
army, was unable to defeat the will of the Peruvian people. Powerless to
enforce his dark intentions without resorting to tyranny and to the violence of
the tanks, President Garcfa was forced to abandon his nationalization plans and
to concede defeat.
It should not have been that way. Perd had a constitution that protected
the shareholders against arbitrary takings of their property. That constitution
should have been enforced. Unfortunately, it was not. Deprived of
constitutional protection and facing the awesome power of the army, the
shareholders went to the Inter-American Commission asking for the protection
" See British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4D, Latin
America and Other Countries, Jul. 31, 1990 (President Alberto Fujimori's State of the Nation
Address, given at the National Congress on July 28, 1990).
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the framers of the constitution had granted to all Peruvian citizens when they
ratified the American Convention. It was their last chance. The Commission
was their "court" of last resort. Ignoring the most basic precepts of its mandate,
the Commission rejected their petition, condoning the injustice of President
Garcfa. This, the Commission should not have done. The future protection of
human rights in the Inter-American system demands that a new mechanism be
implemented in order to prevent injustices like the one done in the Peruvian case
from occurring again. Feasible measures can be undertaken. It is to be hoped
that the General Assembly of the OAS and all lawyers in the Americas press
firmly for the implementation of these measures. As human beings, they can
do no less.
U. Miami Y.B. Int'l Law
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37
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Resolution No. 16/89
CASE 10.169 (PERU)
OEA/Ser.L/V/II/75, Doc. 33, April 14, 1989
BACKGROUND:
1. On March 11, 1988, Mr. David Westin of the law firm Wilmer,
Cutler and Pickering filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (hereinafter the "Commission") on behalf of 105 named
petitioners, all individual shareholders of the Banco de Lima, against the
Government of Peru. The petition alleges violations of Article 8, 21, 24 and 25
of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the "Convention")
by the Government of Peru. The case arises out of President Alan Garcia's
announced plan to expropriate "all of the shares of the Peruvian Banks
remaining in private hands." (Complaint, p.4).
2. The complaint alleges that the government expropriation plan
consisted of two parts: 1) the executive had introduced legislation in Congress
to approve its decision to expropriate the Banks' shares, and 2) the executive,
while the legislation was pending, announced that his government would move
to intervene 131 the Banks. The bill was enacted into law on October 9, 1987
and in mid-November 1987 the court sent to the shareholders a notice of
expropriation filed October 23, 1987, informing the shareholders that the
expropriation proceedings had been commenced and summoning the shareholders
to respond in court. The expropriation notice did not include any appraisal of
the value of the shares and consequently, the shareholders responded to the
court's notice of expropriation by challenging in court the validity of the
proceedings because of the lack of any government appraisal. The complaint
states that "the Banco de Lima shareholders are under the constant threat of
forcible intervention and expropriation." (Complaint, p. 11).
3. The complaint requests that the Commission issue a Resolution
declaring that the Peruvian Government: 1) has violated Articles 8, 24 and 25
of the Convention "by selectively denying petitioners and others prompt, simple
and effective recourse to the Courts of Peru as previously established by law for
vindiction of their fundamental rights in connection with the decreed intervention
137 The text of the resolution in the case of Banco de Lima is cited in full for the convenience
of the reader.
" The term "intervention" as defined by the petitioners means "the government's wrestling of
control of a Bank from its owners and managers."
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of Banco de Lima and expropriation of the Banco de Lima shares; 2) has
violated Article 21 of the Convention by wrongfully decreeing the intervention
of Banco de Lima without any justification in the social interest as defined in the
Convention and in the Constitution; 3) has violated Article 21 of the Convention
by wrongfully decreeing the intervention of Banco de Lima and taking action to
expropriate the shares of Banco de Lima other than in the cases and according
to the forms provided in Peruvian Law; 4) has violated Article 21 of the
Convention by wrongfully threatening to take the shares of Banco de Lima after
selectively changing the rules for determining compensation to the detriment of
Banco de Lima shareholders and resolving that the Peruvian Government 5)
"immediately comply with all outstanding court orders relating to the decreed
intervention of Banco de Lima and the threatened expropriation of its shares;"
and that it 6) "cease and desist from expropriating the shares of Banco de
Lima." (Complaint, pp. 36-38).
4. The Commission transmitted the pertinents parts of the complaint
to the Government of Peru on March 17, 1988 with a request for information
on the facts referred to and for any observations on the question whether
domestic remedies had been exhausted in this case.
5. By note dated June 10, 1988, the Government of Peru sent the
Commission a copy of the disputed law and requested an extension of time of
90 days to respond to the complaint due to the "importance of this law and its
application." By note dated August 8, 1988, the Government of Peru informed
the Commission that it would not have all the information necessary for a
response by August 15th, and it requested a second extension of 30 days,
beginning on that date. The Commission informed both parties that the
requested extension had been granted.
6. During the 74th period of sessions of the Comrission, held from
September 6-16, 1988, the petitioners, at a hearing on the case held on
September 14, 1988, requested the application of precautionary measures
pursuant to article 29 of the Regulations of the Commission maintaining that
irreparable damage to the shareholders in the complaint could occur. The
Commission resolved to deny the application of provisional measures requested
by petitioners on the grounds that "no such decision may be taken without
reference to the merits of the complaint, and such a decision would be premature
since the Government of Peru has yet to present its response in this matter."
7. The response of the Government of Peru, transmitted to the
petitioners on September 21, 1988, stated, is essence, that the law in question
was in conformity with the Peruvian Constitution in so far as the Constitution
provides that "financial and banking activity must fulfill a social function of
helping the Peruvian economy in its different regions and assist all sectors of
activity and of the population in conformity with development plans." The
Government of Peru added that this law is also in conformity with the American
Convention, which provides in Article 21 that the right to property may be
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limited "for reasons of public utility or social interest."
8. By letter dated January 9, 1989, the petitioners reiterated their
request for precautionary measures in this case, arguing that the shareholders of
the Banco de Lima were facing "creeping expropriation" of their assets and were
being denied access to effective judicial remedies. The petitioners again asked
the Commission to resolve "that the Government of Peru shall not take any
action directly or indirectly to expropriate or substantially impair the value of
the property interests at stake in this proceeding until such time as the
Commission has ruled upon the pending petition or until further order of this
Commission."
CONSIDERING:
1. That the Preamble of the American Convention on Human Rights
as well as the provisions of Article 1 (2) provide that "for the purposes of this
Convention, 'person' means every human being," and that consequently, the
system for the protection of human rights in this hemisphere is limited to the
protection of natural persons and does not include juridical persons.
2. That the petitioners base their claim on Article 21 which provides
in relevant part as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his
property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment
to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility
or social interest, and in the cases and according to the
forms established by law.
Consequently, in the Inter-American system, the right to property is a
personal right. The Commission is empowered to vindicate the rights of an
individual whose property is confiscated, but is not empowered with jurisdiction
over the rights of juridical beings, such as corporations, or as in this case,
banking institutions.
3. That in the judgment of the Commission, the named shareholders
of the Banco de Lima, although individuals, have presented this action alleging
that the Government of Peru has taken actions to affect the rights of the Banco
de Lima. The Commission considers that what is at issue here are not the
individual property rights of the individual shareholders, but rather the collective
property rights of the company, the Banco de Lima, and that this case is not
within the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
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4. That for the above reasons the Commission considers that it does
not have to examine the specific factual questions as to whether there has been
a deprivation of property of the shareholders of the Banco de Lima, or whether
there is only the threat of a possible deprivation.
THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
RESOLVES:
1. To declare inadmissible the complaint presented by Mr. David
Westin of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering on behalf of the 105 named
shareholders of the Banco de Lima against the Government of Peru pursuant to
Article 41 (b) of the Regulations of the Commission.
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